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In the 21st century, technological progress is constantly changing the world we are living in. 
Most of all, digital technology seems to have a profound impact on our daily lives: We read 
newspapers on smartphones, we share information on social media and, not least, a 
significant part of us is spending many hours every day working in front of a computer. All 
these aspects of our lives would look very different without digital technology. 
Usually, technological innovations promise an improvement of some sort: We can carry out 
our tasks with less effort than before, or we are able to perform entirely new tasks for the first 
time. Therefore, one could assume that technological innovations in general improve our 
lives. Without a doubt, most innovations are meant to do so. However, some strong concerns 
have been raised recently about the effects of technological progress on labor markets. The 
main argument is that, as computers become more powerful, machines can replace human 
labor in a much larger scale than ever before, thus leading to drastic changes on labor 
markets.  
 
Already in the 19th century, Karl Marx feared that machines were going to replace human 
labor in the long run and that there would be widespread unemployment among the working 
classes (Marx 2014). With the continuous development of technology, many others followed 
in Marx’ footsteps and warned of a dystopian future due to a large-scale replacement of 
human labor by machines. Although the predicted effects could not be observed during the 
whole 20th century, the discussion regained popular attention in the beginning of the 21st 
century. The cause for this debate to heat up again clearly lies in the assumption that recent 
technological progress is somehow different than during Marx’ times: In the past, there might 
have been some replacement of human labor by machines, mainly in industrial production 
where machines could easily emulate certain manual tasks. But at the same time, innovative 
technologies have always created enough new jobs to compensate for the ones that 
disappeared. Obviously, this balance of job-loss and job-creation depends heavily on the 
abilities of machines. It seems safe to assume that human labor is generally employed in 
occupations consisting of tasks that machines cannot emulate in a satisfying manner (also 
considering the costs of buying the machine). With limited technological possibilities, there 
were always enough tasks that only humans could do. But with recent developments in 
artificial intelligence and complex algorithms, machines become more powerful than ever 
before. Now they can not only emulate simple manual, but also complex cognitive tasks. 
Therefore, many occupations, that were safe until recently, could now be at risk of being 
replaced by machines (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2012, 2016). 
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Fortunately, this has not (yet) led to widespread unemployment until today. Apparently, there 
are still enough tasks that humans are better suited for than machines. Nevertheless, 
technological progress is still regarded as the main driver of occupational change: Some 
occupations are slowly disappearing due to automation, while others benefit from the use of 
technology and thus become more numerous (Autor 2015; Berman, Bound, and Machin 
1998). But which occupations are we talking about? In the academic literature, two theories 
dominate the discourse. The classic theory suggests that mainly occupations with low skill 
requirements can be replaced by machines, because they consist of tasks that are not too 
difficult to emulate. At the same time, demand for more skilled labor rises, since machines 
allow for higher productivity, but still require some creative inputs or control from highly 
skilled workers. This has become known as the theory of skill-biased technological change 
(SBTC). Thus, following this theory, we might expect that technological progress is leading to 
an occupational upgrading of the whole labor market, where low skilled occupations slowly 
disappear, and the share of high skilled occupations rises over time (Levy and Murnane 
1996). 
Another approach has been developed more recently, and instantly gained much attention: 
the theory of routine-biased technological change (RBTC). Other than on skill requirements, 
it focuses on the specific tasks of different occupations. The basic assumption is that 
machines can more easily emulate routine tasks than others, regardless of their complexity 
or skill requirements. Contrary to what one might expect, occupations with a high share of 
routine tasks are not mostly found at the bottom of the skill distribution, but in its middle (e.g. 
craft workers or office clerks). Therefore, these jobs should be most susceptible to 
automation, while numbers of occupations with low or high skill requirements remain 
relatively stable or even rise. Thus, according to RBTC, technological progress should be 
leading to a polarization of labor markets (Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2006). 
 
The consequences of occupational change are obviously far-reaching: Since skill 
requirements are usually seen as key determinants of an occupation’s wage, the income 
structure of societies might be rearranged drastically depending on the pattern of 
occupational change (upgrading or polarization) (Goos and Manning 2007). In a case of 
general occupational upgrading, for example, many participants of the labor market are 
expected to move to better paid jobs over time. Lower income occupations are slowly 
disappearing, and new well-paid jobs are created. Thus, a rising share of the labor market 
will be employed in occupations with high salaries, while low incomes become fewer over 
time. Assuming that incomes within occupations remain constant, this would not only lead to 
higher overall levels of income, but to a more compressed income distribution. 
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In a situation of labor market polarization however, this is not the case: If middle-income jobs 
disappear, a gap between lower- and upper-income earners develops. This is usually seen 
as problematic in at least two ways: First, large groups of middle-income earners might be 
facing serious risks of downward mobility if machines take over their jobs and they don’t 
succeed in finding a better one (Autor and Dorn 2013). This is certainly unwanted by at least 
the directly affected people. Second, the risk of social tensions might increase if middle-
income jobs disappear and labor markets become dominated by two polarized groups. Even 
more than inequality, polarization is often seen as a cause for social conflict due to its clear 
display of opposing interests. In situations of high inequality there might still be a continuous 
distribution of wealth or income, thus making it hard for people to form groups of interest. But 
in a situation of polarization this is not the case: Here, there are only two groups and it is 
usually quite clear which one a person belongs to, since there is not much common ground 
between them. Thus, polarized groups are quite likely to develop an antagonistic character, 
especially if the polarization is based on something as fundamental as income or wealth 
(Esteban and Ray 1994). 
 
Evidence in support of SBTC or RBTC has both been observed in many different empirical 
studies. They all share the insight that occupations with high skill requirements and high 
incomes have increased their share on labor markets in Europe and the USA over the last 
decades. But if we look at the development of middle- and low-skilled occupations, results 
vary significantly, depending on sample selection and methods of choice. First, there seems 
to be a change over time from upgrading to polarization: In the second half of the 20th century, 
general upgrading seemed to be the normal case for many countries. Then later, in the 21st 
century, the same countries sometimes moved on to a pattern of polarization (Acemoglu and 
Autor 2011; Wright and Dwyer 2003). However, not all of them did do so. Some countries 
continue to show a clear pattern of general occupational upgrading, neither with a significant 
increase in low-skilled occupations nor with an alarming erosion of the middle class. Among 
the countries that are often found to display a clear pattern of polarization are the USA and 
the UK (Autor et al. 2006; Goos and Manning 2003, 2007), while Scandinavian countries are 
regularly mentioned as examples for occupational upgrading without polarization 
(Fernández-Macías 2012; Oesch 2013). However, different authors don’t always agree on 
the pattern of occupational change that they find in a country. Different methodical 
approaches and case selections seem to lead to different conclusions. Probably also for this 
reason, a consensus about the general trends of occupational change in Europe does not 
exist yet. Some recent authors state a trend towards polarization with much conviction (Goos, 
Manning, and Salomons 2009, 2014), while others find both patterns simultaneously 
(Fernández-Macías 2012), or even a general trend towards occupational upgrading (Oesch 
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2013). Therefore, the goal of this thesis is to explain the mixed evidence concerning 
occupational change in Europe. 
 
To begin searching for an answer, I review again in chapter 1 the most important theoretical 
concepts that try to explain how technology shapes occupational change. These are the 
theories of SBTC and RBTC. Both of these theories explain what makes certain occupations 
more susceptible to automation than others. These theories’ implications regarding 
upgrading or polarization are also discussed in more detail in this chapter. 
Next, I present a selection of influential empirical studies about the topic in chapter 2. Some 
of the most regarded papers are based on data about the USA, why I don’t want to leave 
them out, but much of the presented evidence is based on European countries. As already 
mentioned, there is evidence for upgrading and polarization effects, depending on case 
selection and methods of analysis. Therefore, I am going to compare the studies with regard 
to these characteristics, hoping that this might give us a first hint why different authors find 
different patterns of occupational change in Europe. If, for example, different methods 
systematically produce different results, I would have to consider this in my own analysis. 
Starting with chapter 3, I present findings from my own analysis. By using a large dataset of 
the European Labor Force survey (ELFS), I examine the patterns of occupational change in 
23 European countries over 17 years from 1998 until 2015. In chapter 3, I describe this 
dataset and the change it displays for different occupational groups over time. Most 
importantly, I describe which groups increase or decrease their employment share over time 
and which specific occupations are growing or disappearing fastest. 
In chapters 4 and 5, I examine whether national labor markets display patterns of upgrading 
or polarization. To do so however, I must first create a ranking of occupations. In the 
literature, occupations are most often ranked by their skill requirements, but these are not 
always measured the same way. Some authors measure them based on educational 
attainments, others according to occupations’ mean or median income. I decide to use both, 
since different measurements might lead to different conclusions. Thus, chapter 4 describes 
the patterns of occupational change regarding the educational structure, and chapter 5 does 
the same regarding the wage structure.  
Since chapters 4 and 5 systematically show different results, I examine the data more closely 
in chapter 6. Obviously, some occupations must be ranked differently in the educational 
structure than in the wage structure, and vice versa. Only this can cause the observed 
discrepancy in patterns of occupational change. By analyzing the composition of growth or 
decline across the educational and the wage structure, I assess which occupations are 
responsible for this phenomenon. Based on these findings, I then argue that patterns of 
occupational change must always be analyzed separately for the educational and the wage 
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structure. Following this, I am going to examine whether patterns of occupational change in 
these two structures can really be explained by how easily certain occupations can be 
emulated by machines, as proposed by SBTC or RBTC. As it turns out however, none of the 
proposed measures of susceptibility to automation are powerful enough to explain the 
observed patterns of occupational change all by themselves. Thus, I conclude that there 
must be other relevant factors than technical feasibility that define occupational change. 
Based on this insight, I present several other potential determinants of occupational change 
in chapter 7. First, I introduce a new theoretical framework, in order to properly include the 
alternative effects into theory. I argue that occupational change is not only defined by how 
easily certain tasks are automated, but also by the potential benefits of doing so. As 
examples, I discuss the benefits of saving wages and of potential productivity gains. Further, 
I argue that the human preference for interpersonal contact might prevent automation of 
certain jobs. Lastly, I add to the list of potential influences the effect of offshoring which is 
frequently discussed in debates on occupational change. 
Even though a combination of these effects might be able to explain general trends in 
occupational change, they are unable to explain the observed differences between countries. 
Therefore, chapter 8 deals with this issue. First, I show how patterns of occupational change 
depend on the original composition of labor markets. Next, I examine how national 
institutions affect the wage structure of labor markets and thus the cost-benefit analysis of 
employers who are thinking about automation of jobs. Lastly, I also show how growth of 
occupations at the top of the employment structure is depending on supply of highly 
educated workers. 
Finally, I briefly want to examine the connection between patterns of occupational change 
and unemployment in chapter 9. Different authors claim that upgrading of labor markets 
drastically reduces the number of jobs which are available to workers with low education. In a 
situation of labor market polarization however, many jobs with low educational requirements 
are available, and even more are newly created. Thus, unemployment is expected to be 
higher in upgrading labor markets than in polarizing ones. Therefore, I want to test whether 






1. Competing Theories 
 
Since the beginning of industrialization, people have been worried about the increasing use 
of machines and its consequences for human labor. In the 19th century, Karl Marx was one 
of the first authors to analyze the developments of his time systematically. He concludes that 
automation would, on one hand, transform human labor from skilled artisans into mere 
mechanical parts of machines, causing general downgrading of skills. On the other hand, he 
claims that machines will replace human labor increasingly and therefore cause massive 
unemployment among the working classes (Adler 1990; Marx 2014). 
Marx might have been right to draw these conclusions, based on the empirical evidence in 
his time. However, labor markets developed quite differently in the meantime. According to 
academic consensus, automation has neither led to widespread unemployment nor a 
downgrading of skills. In fact, quite the opposite took place: Employment rates and demand 
for highly skilled labor have risen higher than ever before (Autor 2015). And, as most authors 
conclude, technology was responsible for this. Of course, other effects such as offshoring or 
the economic cycle, might offset the effect of technology in short timeframes. But in the long 
run, technology is generally assumed to be responsible for the most drastic changes in the 
occupational structure (Berman et al. 1998). For instance, one of the most drastic changes in 
recent history happened in the agricultural sector: Employment in agriculture decreased from 
41% of the labor market to less than 2% in the USA during the 20th century (Autor 2014). 
Since production increased at the same time, automation of agricultural work is likely to be 
the main driver of this development (Dimitri, Effland, and Conklin 2005). But why did 
technology have such an impact for occupations in this sector and less so in others? To 
answer this question, I am going to discuss the most important contemporary theories about 
technology and occupational change in this chapter. All present theories try to explain why 
technology is a main cause for recent occupational change and how different occupations 
are affected in different ways by technological progress. 
First, I am going to present the theory of skill-biased technological change (SBTC) in more 
detail. This approach has been the standard explanation of occupational change until quite 
recently, when it was challenged by a new theory which I present in the second section of 
this chapter: routine-biased technological change (RBTC). Those two approaches are 
certainly the most influential and most widely discussed theories about occupational change.  
 
 
Skill-Biased Technological Change (SBTC) 
 
I already mentioned Marx who argued that technology would replace skilled workers and 
lead to a general downgrading of skills. This was probably true during his times, when skilled 
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artisans were replaced by machines and large scale industrial production fostered demand 
for cheap, unskilled labor (Goldin and Katz 1998). However, more recent computer 
technology seems to have turned this effect into its opposite: As technology became more 
complex, using it became increasingly demanding. This is easy to see if we compare 
classical assembly-line machinery with modern computers. In the assembly-line, workers 
typically had to repeat the same simple mechanical movements, because the machine was 
not capable of dealing with any other inputs. But with modern computers, the potential 
combinations of inputs are limitless (as are the outputs) and therefore, using a computer 
generally requires more skills than being part of an assembly-line. Even simply 
understanding how computers can be used is usually much more demanding than 
understanding what an assembly-line does. In addition, people working with computers are 
often required to decide about inputs themselves. To do so, they need abstract analytical 
skills “such as problem-solving or creative thinking” (Oesch 2013:14). Examples are graphic 
designers, software engineers, or all kinds of managers. They use computers, but their skills 
cannot be emulated by machines (yet). In the opposite: Their skills are complementary to 
what machines can do and are therefore essential for any production in their respective 
sector. Moreover, machines increase the potential output of workers who own these skills, 
making them more efficient and therefore more profitable. Thus, many authors expect recent 
technology to increase demand for highly skilled labor (Autor, Katz, and Krueger 1998; Bell 
1973; Levy and Murnane 1996; Spitz‐Oener 2006). 
 
On the other hand, recent technological change is also expected to decrease demand for 
lowly skilled labor according to SBTC. The reason is that machines are generally built to 
replace human labor, but they are better capable of emulating some tasks than others. And 
as supporters of the SBTC-approach claim, machines are more capable of emulating tasks 
typically found in low skilled occupations than those found in high skilled occupations. For 
example, they can more easily emulate the work of assembly-line workers and farmers than 
the work of professors and managers. If we want to know why, we must look at the 
characteristics of different tasks. As already mentioned, occupations requiring high skills 
typically include a fair amount of abstract analytical tasks, which are difficult to emulate 
because they require creativity or complex deliberation. Easier to emulate however are tasks 
that can be fully described by a clearly defined set of rules. Whether this is sawing boards in 
2 meters length or watering each plant on a field with a certain amount of fertilizer, these 
rules can be followed without much creative thinking. For this reason, it is possible to define 
these rules explicitly and build machines that can follow them. And as soon as a machine 
can perform the same task as a human worker, it seems only a matter of time until it starts 
replacing human labor in this domain. Now if we look at the tasks typically found in low 
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skilled occupations, we find that they often have a mechanical and repetitive character. In 
consequence, they can be easily described by rules and therefore fulfilled by machines. Thus, 
machines are more capable of replacing low skilled labor than replacing high skilled labor, 
which leads to a relative decrease in demand of low skilled labor (Acemoglu 2002; 
Fernández-Macías and Hurley 2017). 
 
To sum it up, SBTC claims that technological change increases demand for high skilled labor 
and decreases demand for low skilled labor. Accordingly, the share of high skilled labor is 
expected to rise, while low skilled labor should become less prevalent. In the literature, this is 
called occupational upgrading. 
 
 
Routine-Biased Technological Change (RBTC) 
 
The theory of skill-biased technical change was very prominent in the 1990s and continues to 
be one of the main approaches to explain occupational change. However, in the early 2000s, 
another idea started to question essential assumptions of SBTC: New authors such as Levy 
& Murnane (1996) or Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) raised the question whether 
automation of labor really affects low skilled occupations the most. Even though they agree 
that occupations with a mechanical and repetitive (routine) character are most affected by 
automation, they disagree about which occupations are in fact possessing these qualities.  
Their main argument is that skill requirements of occupations are not as closely related to 
their respective task content as claimed by SBTC: Some occupations with low skill 
requirements might have a low degree of routine work, which makes them hard to emulate, 
and some occupations with high skill requirements might have a high degree of routine work, 
which makes them easier to emulate. Thus, according to these authors, skill requirements 
are not good predictors of whether occupations can be automated or not. Instead, they claim 
that we must examine the routine content of occupations directly, since this is what really 
makes occupations susceptible to automation (Acemoglu and Autor 2011, 2012). Based on 
this insight, the authors of RBTC categorize occupations into different groups, depending on 
the nature of tasks that they consist of. In the pioneering work by Autor, Levy and Murnane 
(2003), three different categories are described. 
 
First, there are occupations which consist mainly of routine tasks. They are the ones that are 
clearly most susceptible to automation, independently of whether these tasks are manual or 
cognitive. By definition, every kind of routine task can be translated into a set of explicit rules 
which can be followed by machines. Therefore, this category includes harvesting workers or 
assembly line workers, but also higher skilled occupations such as bank tellers or 
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bookkeepers. Clearly, the tasks of some occupations in this group might be more complex 
than the tasks of others. However, this is not what matters, since even complex tasks can 
sometimes easily be codified. Complex mathematical calculations, for example, require many 
years of education, but are always to solve by the same strategy. Therefore, electronic 
calculators have replaced human computers long ago. 
Second, Autor, Levy and Murnane describe occupations which consist mainly of analytic and 
interactive non-routine tasks. Among them are scientists, doctors, and lawyers, but also 
managers and negotiators. These tasks are very difficult to emulate because they require 
creative or analytical skills as well as the capability to interact with people, which computers 
currently don’t possess yet. Instead, these occupations often benefit from strong 
complementary effects, since their work is made more efficient by computers. Thus, the 
authors expect this group of occupations to grow with technological progress. 
Third, they find a group of occupations which mainly consist of manual non-routine tasks. 
Janitors, cleaners or truck drivers are mentioned as examples for this group. They all have in 
common that they neither require the analytical or creative skills needed for abstract tasks, 
nor are they definable enough by a strict set of rules to be called routine. Usually, these jobs 
can be done with very little training or education, only basic communication skills and hand-
eye coordination is needed. But nevertheless, they cannot easily be replaced by machines 
because interpersonal communication and body control are clearly non-routine activities: 
Every part of a conversation is - in a sense - a unique situation with its own rules. And even 
cleaners or drivers, who don’t need to communicate much except for taking orders, must 
adapt constantly to different environments which makes it hard to find universally valid rules 
for their jobs. Humans seem to master these challenges almost instinctively without much 
consideration, but for machines this is much more difficult. Manual non-routine tasks are 
therefore not easily emulated by machines. Other than analytic and interactive non-routine 
occupations however, manual non-routine occupations don’t benefit from complementary 
effects either, since computers don’t make their work much more efficient. Thus, the labor 
market share of this group is expected to remain relatively constant. 
 
If we look at the skill requirements of these three groups, we find with little surprise that 
occupations containing analytic and interactive non-routine tasks are typically the ones with 
the highest skill requirements. They are expected to increase their numbers for the same 
reasons as given before. On the other side, manual non-routine occupations usually require 
the least skills of all. According to SBTC, this group would be bound to shrink because of a 
decrease in demand for unskilled labor. But since machines cannot easily emulate manual 
non-routine tasks, this is not likely to happen according to RBTC. The only group that is 
bound to shrink according to this approach is the group of routine occupations. And these are 
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now found in the middle of the skill distribution, not at the bottom, as claimed by SBTC. Thus, 
the authors of RBTC conclude that the important distinction is not between levels of skills, 
but between levels of routine (Acemoglu and Autor 2011). Therefore, this effect is called 
routine-biased technological change (RBTC) (Goos et al. 2014). 
 
The prevalence of routine occupations in the middle of the skill spectrum has important 
implications for the structure of the whole labor market. If occupations in the extremes of the 
spectrum become more prevalent and numbers of jobs requiring medium skills are 
decreasing, we find ourselves in a situation of labor market polarization. Instead of a 
continuous distribution of skills in the labor market, two distinct groups with opposed 
characteristics emerge. This is of special importance, because levels of skill are closely 
connected to levels of income in general (Liu and Grusky 2013). Therefore, if the labor 
market becomes polarized with respect to skills, it is very likely that there will also be a 
polarization regarding incomes (Autor et al. 2006). Some of the people working in routine 
occupations might make the step up and get a high skilled job. But many of them will only 
have the option to settle for a job with low skill requirements, thus facing downward mobility 
(Autor and Dorn 2013). According to RBTC, technological change is thus likely to increase 
income inequality (Autor et al. 2006). 
 
If we compare SBTC and RBTC, it is obvious that they differ in their views about which group 
is bound to shrink. These views also bring different implications for the labor market itself and 
its participants. According to SBTC, we can expect widespread occupational upgrading and 
therefore better jobs for labor market participants on average. On the downside, workers with 
low skills are in a difficult position because demand for their services decreases. This might 
lead to higher unemployment rates or lower wages among low skilled workers. According to 
RBTC however, the average job is not necessarily getting better, since both high and low 
skilled occupations increase their numbers. For low skilled workers, this is good news: They 
have better chances to find jobs if occupations with low requirements don’t disappear. But 
this is paid for with an eroding middle class and a polarization of the labor market (Oesch 
2013:16). Most of this thesis is dedicated to the question whether SBTC or RBTC is right 
about occupational change in Europe. I want to find out whether there is occupational 
upgrading or labor market polarization to be observed in European countries. The problem of 







2. Mixed Evidence 
 
As we saw in chapter 1, there are different theories about the effects of technological 
progress on occupational change. One argues that technological progress leads to general 
upgrading of the occupational structure, the other one expects to see a polarization of labor 
markets due to technological replacement of the middle class. These are obviously two 
contradictory assumptions, which cannot both be true at the same time for one country. To 
decide which theory is most convincing, we must therefore rely on empirical data. Only by 
testing the empirical implications of both theories, it is possible to come to a real 
understanding of how automation affects occupational change. Therefore, I want to present 
some of the most influential empirical studies on the topic in this chapter. First, I am going to 
summarize the different findings in chronological order, thereby giving an overview of recent 
developments in this field of research. Considering the contradictory theoretical assumptions, 
it is not very surprising that the empirical evidence on the topic is mixed as well. Therefore, in 
the second part of this chapter, I take the same studies again and examine them from a more 
analytical point of view: By comparing the samples and methods that were used in the 




From Upgrading to Polarization? 
 
Until the end of the last century, the case seemed to be quite clear: All the available evidence 
was pointing towards uniform upgrading of the occupational structure in economically 
advanced countries (e.g. Autor et al. 1998; Berman et al. 1998). Since SBTC seemed to be a 
perfectly suitable explanation for this development, there was little reason to doubt neither 
the empirical observation nor the underlying theoretical reasoning. Therefore, it seemed to 
be a consensus that technology is replacing mostly low-skilled labor, while creating higher 
demand for highly skilled labor. 
However, this consensus was seriously challenged in the new millennium by a paper 
published by Wright and Dwyer (2003). In it, they analyze the pattern of occupational change 
in the USA between 1963 and 2000. During the first decades of the analysis, they find 
everything as expected according to SBTC: Occupations with high wages expand rapidly, 
while those with low wages show relative decline. But towards the end of their sample period, 
they started to observe a different pattern: Now, starting in the 1980s, jobs at the bottom of 
the employment structure were suddenly declining less than those in the middle. They found 
a transition from occupational upgrading to labor market polarization. 
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Although Wright and Dwyer were not particularly interested in the effects of technology on 
labor markets in 2003, their findings had far-reaching consequences for this discussion when 
they were later combined with the insights of two other articles from the same year. One of 
them, written by Goos and Manning (2003), finds a similar move towards polarization in 
Britain between 1979 and 1999. Obviously, this was additional support for critics who didn’t 
believe in SBTC. But they still needed an alternative theory to explain what could be 
observed. Luckily for them, this theory came in the right time: Still in 2003, Autor, Levy and 
Murnane published an article that introduced a revolutionary approach which was able to 
explain the observed patterns of labor market polarization: Routine-biased technological 
change (RBTC). 
Together, these three articles built the foundation of many following research projects. 
Various countries were examined, diverse sample periods were chosen, and different 
methods were used in those studies. However, conclusions were usually not too different 
from each other: Starting their sample periods in the 1980s or later, most authors found 
evidence for labor market polarization, thus supporting the assumptions of RBTC. 
 
The first breakthrough of the topic was achieved by Autor, Katz & Kearney who published an 
article with the title “The Polarization of the U.S. Labor Market” in 2006. This was the first 
article on labor market polarization that gained public attention internationally and it still 
remains one of the most cited articles on the topic to day. In it, the authors not only find 
further support for polarization regarding wages, but also show that the same pattern applies 
to education: The share of occupations with high and low educational requirements is rising, 
and the share of occupations in the middle is declining. 
Not long after that, the analysis of European labor markets also started to gain more 
attention. To my knowledge, the first comprehensive analysis was conducted by Fernández-
Macías and Hurley (2008) on behalf of the European Union. Using data from 23 different 
countries between 1995 and 2006, they show that labor market polarization is not consistent 
across countries. Although some countries clearly display a pattern of polarization, linear 
upgrading is just as clear in other countries. And, of course, they found many countries that 
fall between the two categories. 
Unfortunately, the findings of Fernández-Macías and Hurley did not get much attention in the 
scientific community back then. Potential reasons might be their publication channel outside 
the usual scientific journals, or their forbearance to put their research in reference to the 
findings of the other authors mentioned above. Therefore, an article written by Goos, 
Manning and Salomons (2009) stepped into the breach and presented their own 
comprehensive analysis of labor markets in Europe. But even though they were working with 
a similar sample, they came to very different conclusions: They observed pervasive 
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polarization of labor markets in Europe. Naturally, both conclusions were well founded. The 
inconsistent results were simply a product of different methods. Nevertheless, the article by 
Goos, Manning and Salomons received much more attention than the one by Fernández-
Macías and Hurley, and the prevalent opinion became that labor market polarization was 
inevitable. Different empirical studies supported this view in following years (Autor 2015; 
Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2015; Goos et al. 2014) 
A few years later, however, the more nuanced view had its comeback. First, Oesch & Menes 
(2011) found significant variation in the degree of polarization between Britain, Germany, 
Spain, and Switzerland, which they traced back to different national institutions. This view 
gained further support by Dwyer and Wright (2012), who came to the same conclusion in an 
updated and expanded version of their original study from 2003, this time also including 
several European countries. Then, also, Fernández-Macías (2012) published another article, 
presenting roughly the same findings as before, but now choosing the right publication 
channels and putting his findings in proper context, thus gaining more attention than before. 
Other recent examples worth mentioning are the works of Oesch (2013) or Murphy and 
Oesch (2017) who both underline the importance of national institutions. 
Due to these insights, a new controversy emerged in recent years. Suddenly, labor market 
polarization doesn’t seem inevitable anymore, but there is neither a consensus about the 




Comparison of Samples and Methods 
 
As seen in the last section, there is no consensus about the effects of technological progress 
on labor markets in the USA and Europe. Some authors find evidence of pervasive 
polarization, others emphasize that there are different developments to be observed across 
countries. In this section, I want to compare the different ways how these contradicting 
conclusions were drawn. First, I focus on sample selection, then on the measurement of 
skills. A summary of recent influential articles and their relevant characteristics is presented 
in table 1 at the end of this chapter. 
 
A first important observation can be made by comparing sample periods: In earlier years, 
most countries display a pattern of occupational upgrading, and later, they tend towards 
polarization. Thus, it seems like the increasing capabilities of machines slowly altered the 
patterns of occupational change. This is in line with the argument of RBTC: At first, machines 
could only replace labor in the bottom of the occupational structure, but later, machines 
learned to carry out more complex tasks, thereby enabling them to replace labor in the 
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middle of the occupational structure. This transition from upgrading to polarization was 
examined in detail for the USA by Wright & Dwyer (2003) and Autor & Acemoglu (Acemoglu 
and Autor 2011). Thus, my first observation is that, according to the literature, there is 
probably a transition from upgrading to polarization over time.  
 
More interesting, however, are comparisons of the countries under examination. By looking 
at table 1, it is easy to notice that most of the early research about the topic was conducted 
either in the USA or in Britain (e.g. Autor et al. 2006; Goos and Manning 2003, 2007; Wright 
and Dwyer 2003). In both these countries, a clear pattern of polarization was found after the 
1980s, and following research continued to confirm these findings. Thus, it is fairly safe to 
assume that there is some consensus about the development of labor markets in Britain and 
the USA. But in other European countries, the case is not quite as clear. Even though Goos, 
Manning and Salomons (2009, 2014) claim to find a pervasive pattern of polarization in all 
European countries under scrutiny, various other authors disagree (Dwyer and Wright 2012; 
Fernández-Macías 2012; Fernández-Macías and Hurley 2008; Oesch 2013; Oesch and 
Menés 2011). These authors all share the view that there are different patterns of 
occupational change to be found across countries in Europe. In some cases, polarization is 
clearly visible, in other cases, polarization is only weak or not observed at all. Nevertheless, 
even these authors usually agree with the findings of early studies on the USA and Britain: 
These two countries are usually amongst the countries that display the most distinct pattern 
of polarization. 
An often-cited explanation for the strong polarization in the USA and Britain is that their 
liberal institutions allow for more growth in the bottom of the employment structure than in 
other countries (Dwyer and Wright 2012; Fernández-Macías 2012; Oesch 2013; Oesch and 
Menés 2011). Other country-level characteristics are discussed as potential explanations as 
well, but for now, it is only important to state that there probably are differences between 
countries. This implies that we cannot assume a uniform effect of technology on labor 
markets. The effect apparently depends on certain characteristics of particular labor markets, 
which are most likely shaped by national institutions or other country-level characteristics. 
These country-specific determinants certainly deserve appropriate attention. Therefore, I will 
examine the relationship between national characteristics and occupational change in more 
detail in chapter 8 of this thesis. 
 
These two aspects of empirical research (i.e. the selection of sample periods and country 
samples) seem to explain much of the variation in authors’ conclusions about the effects of 
technological progress on labor markets. Accordingly, these points are also frequently 
discussed in the recent literature on the topic (e.g. Fernández-Macías 2012; Oesch 2013). 
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But there is another crucial aspect that has not gained much attention yet: the ranking of 
occupations. As we know, occupations are usually ranked according to their skill 
requirements in order to determine whether labor markets are upgrading or polarizing. Thus, 
the measurement of skills is one of the most central concepts in the literature. Yet, it is often 
used without the necessary consideration. 
As we saw in chapter 1, the classic theories about technology-related occupational change 
are both speaking about skills originally: According to SBTC, low skilled occupations shrink, 
high skilled occupations rise. Later, RBTC claimed that occupations in the middle of the skill 
spectrum are disappearing faster than those at the bottom because they are more strongly 
based on routine tasks. To test these theories with empirical data, it is therefore necessary to 
categorize occupations according to their skill requirements. This is not an easy task 
however, since skills cannot directly be measured with conventional methods. Therefore, skill 
requirements are usually operationalized by using either educational attainments or wages 
(or both) as proxies in virtually all available studies. These two variables are expected to be 
the closest possible representation of skills, since education is essentially meant to improve 
one’s skills, and higher skills should directly translate into higher wages (Autor et al. 2006; 
Fernández-Macías 2012). 
Especially in older studies from before the turn of the millennium, education was frequently 
used to provide evidence for the theory of SBTC. The occupational upgrading, that was 
found thereby, was essentially an educational upgrading of the occupational structure. With 
the rise of RBTC however, things got mixed up a little. Now, the use of wages as proxies 
became more common, and more analyses started to show a pattern of polarization. 
Surprisingly however, not many authors seemed to be aware of this methodical issue. Most 
of them simply stated that the two proxies could be used interchangeably and would produce 
the same results in the end. This seemed plausible, since wages and education should both 
represent skills, and it could be shown that both of them correlate strongly with each other. 
But only few studies actually used both variables in their analyses. Possibly, many authors 
relied on the results of Autor, Katz & Kearney (2006) who could show convincing evidence 
for polarization in the USA, using both income and education as proxies for skills. This 
seemed to be proof enough that income and education could in fact be used interchangeably. 
Therefore, most following studies only used wages in their analyses. At least two European 
studies however tested both proxies and came to interesting results: Fernández-Macías 
(2012), who found varying patterns of upgrading and polarization among different European 
countries, states that his findings are fairly consistent, independent of the proxy for skills that 
he uses. However, he also mentions that there is a slightly stronger tendency towards 
upgrading if skills are measured by education. These remarks are complemented by Oesch 
(2013) who also tested both proxies. He notes that, especially in Britain, patterns of 
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occupational change vary depending on the proxy for skills. If measured by wages, Britain 
clearly displays polarization, but if measured by education, it clearly shows upgrading. 
Further investigating this issue, he finds that some occupations rank higher in the 
educational ranking than in the wage-ranking and vice versa: Occupations in production and 
crafts rank higher in wages than in education, and occupations in personal and social 
services rank higher in education than in wages. And since the former are declining and the 
latter are increasing, he observes different patterns of occupational change in Britain, 
depending on the proxy for skills. 
Unfortunately, both Fernández-Macías and Oesch only treat these issues on a side note and 
don’t seem to think of them as very important. Nevertheless, these are certainly significant 
findings that should be examined in more detail. Possibly, further investigation could help us 
understand why some countries display a pattern of polarization and others don’t. Therefore, 






Table 1: Summary of Recent Articles Concerning Upgrading/Polarization of Labor Markets (Selection) 
Year Author(-s) Years covered Countries covered 
Occupations 
ranked by… Findings 
1998 Autor, Katz & Krueger 1940-1996 USA Education Upgrading 
2003 Goos & Manning 1979-1999 Britain Wages Polarization 
2003 Wright & Dwyer 1963-2000 USA Wages Upgrading → Polarization 
2006 Autor, Katz & 
Kearney 
1980-2000 USA Wages & 
Education 
Polarization (for both wages & education) 
2007 Goos & Manning 1975-1999 Britain Wages Polarization 
2008 Fernández-Macías & 
Hurley 
1995-2006 23 European  
countries 
Wages Upgrading & polarization, depending on country 
2009 Goos, Manning & 
Salomons 
1993-2006 16 European  
countries 
Wages Polarization 
2010 Acemoglu & Autor 1979-2007 USA Wages Upgrading → Polarization 
2010 Oesch & Menes 1990-2008 GB, DE, ES, CH Wages Tendency towards polarization, but degree depending on country 
2012 Dwyer & Wright 1995-2007 USA & 16 European 
countries 
Wages Tendency towards polarization, but degree depending on country 




Upgrading & polarization, depending on country (for both wages & 
education). Slightly stronger tendency towards upgrading if education 
is used. 
2013 Autor & Dorn 1980-2005 USA Wages Polarization 




Upgrading & polarization, depending on country (for both wages & 
education). 
2014 Goos, Manning & 
Salomons 
1993-2010 16 European  
countries 
Wages Polarization 
2015 Autor 1979-2012 USA Wages Polarization 
2015 Autor, Dorn & Hanson 1990-2007 USA Wages Polarization 




3. Occupational Change 
 
As we saw in chapters 1 and 2, there is no consensus about the patterns of occupational 
change in Europe. Contradicting theories and varying empirical approaches make it hard to 
come to generally valid conclusions. Therefore, I want to conduct my own analysis of 
occupational change in Europe in this chapter, while trying to consider all the issues that 
were raised in chapter 2 (sample selection and measurement of skills). I begin by describing 
my main source of data, the European Labor Force Survey, and the sample that I use. This 
is followed by a first examination of occupational change, based on standard occupational 
categories according to ISCO-classifications. 
 
 
Data & Method 
 
To analyze the labor markets of a large set of European countries, the European Labor 
Force Survey (ELFS) is the obvious choice as a source of data. It contains detailed survey 
data from all 28 member-states of the European Union as well as from Iceland, Norway, and 
Switzerland. By using large national samples, the survey is designed to produce data that 
covers the entire labor market of each country. Furthermore, the data produced by the ELFS 
is highly suitable for cross-country analyses, since all variables are standardized. 
Naturally, my analysis only includes persons that were employed or self-employed at the 
time of the interview. This excludes persons that were unemployed or not in the labor force. 
Further, I exclude military occupations from my analysis, since they are employed in a sector 
that is entirely dependent on political decisions and therefore does not follow the same 
processes as the civil labor market. 
 
For my purpose, the most important variable is clearly the one describing a person’s 
occupation. The ELFS uses ISCO-classifications at the 3-digit level, which describes more 
than 100 different occupational groups in each country. Although I use this detailed data for 
creating mean scores of education- and wage-levels, I only use the 2-digit classification for 
the labor market analysis, because otherwise I would have to deal with many empty 
categories and issues of inconsistent categorization across countries. The 2-digit 
classification mostly solves these problems and still offers 28 (ISCO88) or 43 (ISCO08) 
occupational groups. 
A major obstacle however is that the ISCO-scheme was completely revised in 2008, and the 
ELFS started to use the revised ISCO-version in 2011. This makes it impossible to directly 
compare the development of detailed occupations before and after 2011. But, since I don’t 
want to ignore the most recent developments, I decide to choose a sample that allows to 
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handle this problem as well as possible. In fact, I don’t just use one sample, but two. One of 
them ranges from 1998 until 2010 and the other one from 2011 until 2015. This way, I can 
present separate evidence for the two periods, whenever I speak about detailed occupations, 
but cover the whole time period from 1998 until 2015 whenever I examine comparable 
variables such as education, wages, or even broad occupational groups. 
 
Due to missing data or inconsistent categorization, I must omit several countries from my 
analysis1. This leaves us with a total sample of 23 European countries2 over a 17-year time 
range from 1998 until 2015. All of these countries are members of the OECD; thus, we can 
assume a similar degree of economic and technological development. This is relevant, since 
labor markets in developing countries are obviously affected by technological progress in 
different ways than in economically advanced countries. Nevertheless, of course not all labor 
markets in my sample are exactly alike. There might be other differences which could be of 
importance here. I will come back to this in chapter 8. For now, it is only important that we 
assume a similar level of technological development. 
 
Before the results of my analysis are presented, it is also important to understand the method 
that I use to examine different labor markets. At the foundation of my analysis lies the so-
called “occupation-based approach” (Arntz, Gregory, and Zierahn 2016). This means that my 
units of analysis are not persons, but occupations. Therefore, I collapse the ELFS-dataset, 
creating a count variable for each occupation, separated by countries and years of 
observation. This allows us to calculate the share of employment that each occupation 
possesses in a country in a given year. For example, we could say that, in 1998, 10% of all 
employment in country X falls on occupation Y. 
These percentages are central to my analysis: When I speak of growing or declining 
occupations, I always mean that an occupation’s share of employment in a certain country is 
growing or declining. Thus, the absolute number of persons employed in a certain occupation 
might in fact be rising while the same occupation’s employment share is decreasing. This 
would be the case if total employment in a country is increasing faster than the employment 
in a single occupation. Of course, the example also works the other way around: Absolute 
numbers of an occupation might decrease over time, but relative numbers increase if total 
employment in a country decreases even faster. 
                                               
1 Italy, Latvia, and Lithuania were omitted due to inconsistent categorization. Several other countries 
did not provide data in 1998 yet. 
2 Austria, Belgium, Britain, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. 
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It is necessary to choose this approach based on relative numbers, since I want to compare 
the development of occupations in different countries, thereby giving each country the same 
weight. Otherwise, the size of national labor markets (or rather the size of national samples) 
would bias my results to an unacceptable extent. 
 
 
Growing and Declining Occupations 
 
My first examination of occupational change is rather a descriptive introduction than a test of 
any theories. In fact, it is the most basic analysis of occupational change there is: I simply 
want to show how single occupations increased or decreased their employment share over 
time. In figure 1, I do so by showing the mean employment shares of all major occupational 
groups provided by ISCO across the 23 countries. These mean values are plotted for 
different years in my sample, each with a gap of 4 years. Thereby, it is possible to assess the 
relative size of occupational groups as well as the change of their relative size over time. 
As noted before, ISCO-classifications used by the ELFS changed after 2010. Thus, it is not 
possible to draw any conclusions based on the change between 2010 and 2011 in figure 1. 
The gap between the two bars representing 2010 and 2011 is supposed to underline this 
issue. However, only the composition of major occupational categories was altered, not the 
description of categories themselves. Therefore, we can still compare developments of single 
major occupational groups between 1998 and 2010 with those between 2011 and 2015. 
For example, we can say that the mean employment share of managers has been staying 
quite constant since 1998, both before and after the alteration of ISCO-classifications. But we 
can not say that the employment share of managers decreased between 2010 and 2011, 
even though the bar is lower in 2011 than in 2010. This change is solely due to the new 
classification system. 
Other than the stability of managers’ employment share, we observe a strong and steady 
increase in the mean share of professionals. In fact, professional occupations display the 
strongest expansion of all and thus became the largest occupational group in many countries. 
As the term “professionals” is not exactly self-explanatory, it might make sense to give a 
short description of this group: It consists of a variety of jobs such as scientists, engineers, 
doctors, teachers, and other highly trained occupations. 
Other groups that typically display an increasing employment share are “technicians and 
associate professionals” and service workers. Although not as fast as managers, they both 
steadily increased their labor market share between 1998 and 2010. After 2011, however, 





Figure 1: Mean Employment Share of Major Occupational Groups (ISCO) 
on 23 European Labor Markets, 1998-2015* 
 
* ISCO-classifications were altered between 2010 and 2011. 
 
Naturally, if some occupations expand their share, others’ need to shrink. This is clearly the 
case for four occupational groups: First, agricultural workers seem to disappear slowly. They 
already were by far the smallest group in 1998 and continue to become less numerous. 
Second, craft workers, who were the largest group in 1998, constantly decreased their share 
of the labor market until they only were on fourth rank in 2015. Third, machine operators also 
lost ground since 1998 and an end of this development is not conceivable in the data until 
2015. Fourth, and perhaps surprisingly, another constant decline was observed for clerical 
support workers. 
Finally, the share of elementary occupations did not change much on average. This group 
consists of occupations that “involve the performance of simple and routine tasks which may 
require the use of hand-held tools and considerable physical effort” (International Labor 
Office 2012). Typical examples are cleaners, or laborers in mining, construction, 
manufacturing, and transport. 
As mentioned before, these are only mean values across the 23 countries in my sample. 
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however, national patterns relate very closely to the findings presented here. In almost all 
countries, the same occupational groups grow or decline. For example, professionals expand 
their share in all countries with only one exception (Britain). Also, agricultural workers are 
declining in all countries except in Britain and Ireland. There is only significant variation 
across countries, when we compare the development of managers and elementary 
occupations. Here, some countries display growth, others show decline (see appendix for 
detailed information). 
 
After presenting this brief summary about the development of different major occupational 
groups, we now want to examine these occupations in more detail. Therefore, I leave the 
major occupational groups behind and conduct the same analysis using the 2-digit ISCO-
classification. Instead of 9, we now have 28 (until 2010) respectively 43 (after 2010) 
categories. For obvious reasons, I don’t want to describe each of these categories separately. 
Thus, I limit my analysis to the occupations that changed their employment share the most: I 
show five occupations with the highest average growth and five occupations with the 
steepest average decline. Since the newer ISCO-classification doesn’t correspond with the 
old one on the 2-digit level, we must interpret our two samples separately this time. Results 
for the period between 1998 and 2010 are depicted in table 2, those for the period between 
2011 and 2015 in table 3. 
 
Table 2: Fastest Growing and Declining Occupations in 23 European Countries, 1998-2010 
ISCO88 Description 
Mean 
growth* ISCO88 Description 
Mean 
decline* 
24 Other professionals +1.96% 61 Skilled agricultural and 
fishery workers 
-1.73% 
34 Other associate professionals +1.94% 41 Office clerks -1.46% 
51 Personal and protective 
services workers 
+1.57% 72 Metal, machinery and related 
trades workers 
-1.26% 
21 Physical, mathematical and 
engineering science 
professionals 
+1.17% 74 Other craft and related trades 
workers 
-1.24% 
23 Teaching professionals +0.67% 13 Managers of small 
enterprises 
-1.01% 
* mean growth/decline of employment share in national labor markets 
 
As we would expect based on the findings above, most growth in the period 1998-2010 
comes from occupations summarized as “professionals”. Three of the five fastest growing 
occupations belong to this category. The other two occupations belong to the “technicians 
and associate professionals” and the “service and sales workers” categories which also 
experienced growth as a whole. Unfortunately, both occupations on top of the list are not 
23 
 
very informative, since they are only “other”-categories. To understand what they stand for, 
we must look at their content: “Other professionals” include business professionals, legal 
professionals, archivists, librarians, social scientists, writers, creative or performing artists, 
religious professionals, and public service administrative professionals. “Other associate 
professionals”, on the other hand, include among others: finance and sales associate 
professionals, business services agents, trade brokers, police inspectors, detectives, and 
artistic, entertainment and sports associate professionals. 
On top of the list of fastest declining occupations until 2010 are, not surprisingly, agricultural 
workers. Here, 1-digit and 2-digit categories match each other exactly, since there is no other 
sub-category. The following three occupations are not very surprising either, since they all 
belong to major categories in decline. The last occupation however comes somewhat as a 
surprise: Managers of small enterprises decline quickly in general, although the major 
category of all managers remains almost constant. This must mean that managers of large 
corporations are increasing, thus indicating a possible shift of economic importance from 
small business to large corporations. 
 
Table 3: Fastest Growing and Declining Occupations in 23 European Countries, 2011-2015 
ISCO08 Description 
Mean 
growth* ISCO08 Description 
Mean 
decline* 
24 Business and administration 
professionals 
+0.57% 71 Building and related trades 
workers 
-0.40% 
34 Legal, social, cultural and 
related associate 
professionals 
+0.38% 44 Other clerical support 
workers 
-0.31% 
25 Information and 
communications technology 
professionals 
+0.30% 41 General and keyboard clerks -0.29% 
22 Health professionals +0.30% 33 Business and administration 
associate professionals 
-0.22% 
43 Numerical and material 
recording clerks 




* mean growth/decline of employment share in national labor markets 
 
Due to the revision of ISCO-classifications, many “other”-categories were not used by the 
ELFS anymore after 2010. Instead, new occupational groups were created, which accounts 
for the rise of the available number of 2-digit occupations from 28 to 43. Thus, the list of the 
fastest growing or declining occupations in table 3 is more detailed than the one before. 
However, these findings must be interpreted more cautiously, since only a period of four 
years is covered. 
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Again, we find three “professional” occupations among the ones that display the highest 
growth rates. They are business and administration professionals, information and 
communications technology professionals, and health professionals. Also, an occupation 
representing associate professionals ranks second on the list again. New however is the 
category of numerical and material recording clerks among the occupations with the fastest 
growth. This is somewhat surprising, since the major category of clerical workers is generally 
in decline. 
As we see on the right side of table 3, the growth of numerical and material recording clerks 
is offset by the decline of two other categories of clerical occupations. Declining the most, 
however, is the share of building and related trades workers. Thus, the three occupations 
displaying the most decline after 2010 all belong to major categories that are shrinking in 
general. On the other hand, the other two occupations on the list are part of major 
occupational groups, that stay more or less constant in general. Interestingly, associate 
professionals appear in both sides of table 3: Business and administration associate 
professionals are among the occupations that decline the most. 
 
Reviewing this evidence, we come to a basic understanding of occupational change. We now 
know which major occupational groups are expanding their share on European labor markets 
and which ones are in decline. Also, we know which occupations are growing or declining the 
most. Our findings in this chapter are coherent with theories on technology-based 
occupational change and confirm the findings of previous empirical studies (e.g. Autor 2015; 
Fernández-Macías 2012; Oesch 2013; Oesch and Menés 2011). Therefore, we find support 
for the claim that highly educated professionals and interpersonal service workers are 
expanding their shares the most, since their work is not easily automated, and some of them 
even profit from complementary effects (Autor 2015). The case of quickly increasing 
numbers of information technology professionals is a clear example for these effects. And, 
on the other side, our findings also support the idea that machines can more easily replace 
large numbers of agricultural workers or craftsmen due to their low skill requirements 
(Acemoglu 2002; Fernández-Macías and Hurley 2017) or high routine content (Autor 2015). 
Therefore, these insights might give us a first idea about what kind of occupations are 
affected by technological replacement and what kind are growing due to complementary 
effects. However, we still don’t know why these occupations are affected in the ways they are: 
Are we observing a skill-biased or a routine-biased occupational change? And, closely 
related to this question: Is this leading to an upgrading or to a polarization of labor markets? 




4. Changes in the Educational Structure 
 
As I have discussed in chapter 2, the measurement of skills is a crucial factor when 
assessing the pattern of occupational change in a country. In the existing research, there is 
some evidence suggesting that, if occupations are ranked by their wages, there is stronger 
tendency towards polarization than if they are ranked by their educational requirements. 
Therefore, I want to examine the patterns of occupational change in our sample twice: First, I 
rank occupations by their educational requirements in this chapter, then by their mean wages 
in the next chapter. 
 
 
Observing Patterns of Occupational Change 
 
My following analyses are based on the same data as before: I use the ELFS-data of all 23 
countries in our sample and calculate the national employment share of each occupation for 
different points in time. All occupations are measured on the ISCO 2-digit level. For each 
occupation, I then calculate the mean educational level of all its representatives, separated 
by country. Educational levels of individuals are measured by the six ISCED-97 values, as 
they are included in the ELFS. 
Next, I sort occupations by their mean educational levels and divide them into five different 
groups in each country. Each of these groups is containing approximately 20% of all 
employment in a country at the beginning of our sample period in 1998. These quintiles each 
represent a specific part of a country’s labor market: For example, each quintile 1 includes all 
occupations with the lowest educational scores found in a country. Respectively, each 
quintile 5 stands for the 20% of employment in 1998 that was employed in occupations with 
the highest educational requirements. 
By observing the change in size of each of these quintiles, we can now examine patterns of 
occupational change. If, for example, quintile 5 in country X has grown by 5% between 1998 
and 2015, it means that occupations with the highest educational requirements have 
increased their employment share by 5% in this country. Naturally, another quintile with lower 
education must be shrinking in this case, since we are looking at relative shares of total 
employment. 
 
The pattern of occupational change is then determined by which quintiles grow and which 
ones shrink. In figure 2, three hypothetical examples are depicted. In the left example, we 
would observe a perfect case of occupational upgrading: Occupations with high educational 
requirements have increased their share and those with low requirements have declined in 
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relative terms. The gradual transition from quintile 1 to quintile 5 would indicate an almost 
perfect correlation between educational requirements and job growth. 
In the middle example, however, things look quite different: Here, both quintiles 1 and 5 are 
increasing their employment share, while quintiles in the middle are in relative decline. Thus, 
according to this example, occupations with highest and lowest educational requirements are 
expanding and occupations in the middle of the employment structure are slowly 
disappearing. This would be a typical pattern of polarization. 
 
Figure 2: Hypothetical Patterns of Change in Employment Share 
 
 
These are the two patterns that are usually discussed in the literature. However, there is 
another pattern which is frequently found in empirical studies. It lies somewhere between 
upgrading and polarization, since it displays characteristics of both: As in upgrading patterns, 
the highest quintiles are growing the most, and all lower and middle quintiles are declining. 
But like in polarizing patterns, the decline is considerably faster in middle than in bottom 
quintiles. In the literature, there is no consensus about how this pattern should be 
categorized. Some authors call it rather an upgrading pattern (Oesch 2013), others clearly 
focus on the polarizing aspect (Goos et al. 2009, 2014). This might partly be causing the 
observed discrepancy in the results of these authors. For this reason, I think that this pattern 
should have a name on its own. I am going to call it a pattern of “polarized upgrading” in the 
rest of this thesis. 
 
This approach of observing occupational change was first used by Wright and Dwyer (2003) 
and later became the standard model to examine patterns of occupational change. It is 
important to remember that this is an occupation-based approach. Thus, I am not ranking 

















education (or wages in the next chapter). This means that, if an occupation belongs to 
quintile 1 in 1998, it will remain there for the rest of the sample period. This is necessary to 
measure the growth or decline of a group of occupations, and not the change in people’s 
average education over time. 
 
Due to my sample selection however, there is one major challenge when applying this 
approach: Since ISCO-classifications were altered in 2011, quintiles could not easily be 
observed continuously from 1998 until 2015. Freshly introduced occupations, that were not 
considered in 1998, must be newly categorized, and others, whose description was altered, 
must be revaluated. Therefore, I create new quintiles in 2011, each containing approximately 
20% again. Then, I measure the change of these new quintiles until 2015. 
In the following presentation of my results, I simply add together the change of quintiles 
before and after 2011. One might object to this practice, since the quintiles don’t necessarily 
represent the same group of occupations anymore and therefore making general statements 
about groups would not be defensible. But, as I find, the relative order of occupations 
remains the same in virtually all countries during my sample period. Therefore, very similar 
occupations are found in the same quintiles before and after 2011, which allows me to 
summarize my findings for the whole sample period. This is further supported by the finding 
that patterns of occupational change stay constant over time, even over the classification-





Before we examine the patterns of occupational change themselves, it seems reasonable to 
briefly describe the typical classification of occupations into educational quintiles. This way, 
we don’t just speak about quintiles as empty constructs, but it becomes clear what they 
actually stand for. In table 4, a typical composition is presented. 
 
Table 4: Typical Composition of Educational Quintiles 
Quintile Major Occupational Groups (ISCO 1-digit) 
5 Professionals; (Managers) 
4 Managers; Technicians and associate professionals; (Clerical support workers) 
3 Clerical support workers; Service and sales workers; (Craft and related trades workers) 
2 Service and sales workers; Craft and related trades workers; (Skilled agricultural and 
fishery workers) 





When analyzing the composition of educational quintiles, it is immediately noticeable that 
quintile 5 is almost entirely occupied by professionals in most cases. With the exception of a 
few countries where managers also belong to quintile 5, professional occupations are 
therefore clearly requiring the highest educational attainments of all. Most managers, 
however, are found in quintile 4 among most technicians and associate professionals. In 
some cases, clerical support workers also rank in quintile 4, but most of the time they find 
themselves in the middle of the educational structure in quintile 3. This is also where a large 
part of service and sales occupations are categorized, but these are almost equally 
distributed between quintiles 2 and 3, varying from country to country. Similarly distributed 
are craft occupations, but these are more often found in quintile 2 than in quintile 3. Finally, 
among the 20% of employment with lowest educational requirements, we usually find 
occupations in agriculture, machine operators, and elementary occupations. Although the 
classification of occupations into quintiles is very similar across all countries in our sample, it 
is important to note that there might be some country-specific features that differ from this 
general pattern. 
 
With this in mind, we can now move on to the examination of country-specific patterns of 
occupational change. Several interesting observations can made here. As we see in figure 3, 
quintiles 4 and 5 have grown in virtually all countries between 1998 and 2015. Thus, my 
evidence supports the theoretical claim that highly educated labor is expanding, possibly due 
to complementary effects with technology that lead to higher productivity. 
But looking at the lower quintiles 1-3, we find quite different patterns across countries. Eleven 
of our 23 countries display a clear pattern of educational upgrading: The lowest quintiles are 
declining the most, and the highest quintiles are growing the most, while the middle quintile 
typically remains rather constant. Thus, we observe a more or less perfect linear relationship 
between educational requirements and job growth in these countries. This would clearly 
support the thesis of SBTC. 
Nevertheless, a group of ten other countries is showing signs of labor market polarization. 
They all display the U-shaped pattern of occupational change that is a distinct feature of 
polarization. However, only two countries (Belgium and France) actually include a relative 
growth of quintile 1 and therefore display a classic pattern of polarization. The other eight 
countries all show what I call a pattern of polarized upgrading. In these countries, all growth 
is based on highly educated occupations in quintiles 4 and 5 while all other quintiles are 
declining. However, occupations in the middle of the educational structure are declining even 
faster than those at the bottom in these countries.  
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This doesn’t mean however that polarization is not a relevant issue in these cases. If the 
middle class is disappearing twice as fast as the lower class, there is still going to be a wide 
gap in the occupational structure for a long time. But we should keep in mind that, with the 
exception of Belgium and France, no country displays a pattern of polarization in the narrow 
sense that includes relative job growth in quintile 1. 
 
Overall, this evidence seems to favor the theory of occupational upgrading, even though 
there are some countries with a tendency towards polarization or polarized upgrading. This 
view gains further support if we estimate the average pattern of occupational change across 
all 23 countries in our sample. As shown in figure 4, the average pattern is clearly one of 
occupational upgrading if occupations are ranked by educational requirements: Occupations 
with low requirements decline, and those with high requirements expand. This average 
pattern is also constant over time: It shows up in each 4-year period between 1998 and 
20153. 
 
Figure 4: Mean Relative Change in Employment Share 
by Education Quintiles, 1998-2015 
 
 
Thus, the evidence shown in this chapter clearly supports the theory of SBTC: We find that 
occupations with high educational requirements display strong growth in all examined 
countries, while occupations with low educational requirements show decline in most 
countries. On average, we even find an almost linear, positive relationship between 
educational requirements and change in employment share, exactly as predicted by SBTC: 
The higher the educational requirements of an occupation, the higher its increase in 
employment share.  
                                               












5. Changes in the Wage Structure 
 
I have shown in the last chapter that, if we measure skills by educational requirements, we 
can observe various patterns of occupational change in Europe, but an overall trend towards 
occupational upgrading. In this chapter, I am going to repeat the same analysis using mean 
wages as proxies for skills instead of educational attainments. 
 
 
Adding Data on Mean Wages 
 
Again, I use the same ELFS data sample as before, measuring employment shares of 
occupational groups at the ISCO 2-digit level. Unfortunately, data on income is only available 
for all countries in the ELFS after 2009, and even then, it is measured rather imprecisely and 
remains fragmentary. Therefore, I aggregate income data provided by the EU-SILC4 survey 
and match it with our ELFS-data on occupational change. This way, I assign mean wages to 
each occupation in our sample, separated by country. In 20 of 23 countries, this approach 
produces data on wages for all relevant occupations. Only for Greece, no income data is 
included in the EU-SILC at all. For Portugal, several ISCO88-categories are missing and 
therefore I can only use income data for Portugal after 2010. The opposite is true of Ireland: I 
can only use income data until 2010 because it is incomplete after that. 
After adding mean wages to our dataset, I create quintiles the same way as described in the 
previous chapter, only replacing mean education by mean wages this time. Thus, quintile 1 in 
each country now represents all occupations with the lowest mean wages that together 
account for approximately 20% of all national employment in 1998. Accordingly, each quintile 
5 represents the best paid occupations in each country, also containing roughly 20% of 
employment in 1998. 
 
When examining the composition of wage quintiles in table 5, several differences stand out in 
contrast to the educational quintiles used in the previous chapter. First, occupations tend to 
scatter more strongly across countries in wage quintiles than in educational quintiles. Thus, it 
seems that the educational rankings of occupations are quite similar across countries in our 
sample, while the respective wage rankings display more variation in comparison. In 
consequence, many occupational groups are listed twice in table 5, since they belong to 
different quintiles in different countries without any clear tendency towards one quintile or 
another. 
 
                                               
4 European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions 
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Table 5: Typical Composition of Wage Quintiles 
Quintile Major Occupational Groups (ISCO 1-digit) 
5 Managers; Professionals 
4 Professionals; Technicians and associate professionals 
3 Technicians and associate professionals; Plant and machines operators and 
assemblers; Craft and related trades workers; Clerical support workers 
2 Clerical support workers; Service and sales workers; Craft and related trades workers; 
Plant and machines operators and assemblers; (Skilled agricultural and fishery workers) 
1 Service and sales workers; Skilled agricultural and fishery workers; Elementary 
occupations 
 
Despite the broader allocation of occupations, some groups clearly occupy different positions 
in the wage structure than in the educational structure. For example, a significant change can 
be observed in the top quintiles: The data shows that virtually all professionals are among 
the occupations with highest educational requirements, therefore placed in quintile 5. 
Measured by wages however, many of them are replaced by managers and fall down into 
quintile 4. Some managers apparently earn more than professionals, although their 
educational requirements are lower on average. A similar effect, but at the other end of the 
scale, can be observed for machine operators: Although they are usually found in quintile 1 
among the occupations with lowest mean education, their wages rank much higher and place 
them in quintiles 2 and 3 of the wage structure. 
On the other hand, clerical occupations are usually ranked considerably lower in the wage 
structure than in the educational structure. While they are typically categorized in educational 
quintile 3 and 4, they only belong to wage quintiles 2 and 3. The same pattern also applies to 
service occupations: Ranked by education, they are found in quintiles 2 and 3, but measured 
by wages, they fall down into quintiles 1 and 2. 
 
 
Polarized Upgrading in Wages 
 
Considering the fact that wage quintiles contain different occupations than educational 
quintiles, one might also expect differing patterns of occupational change, depending on 
which quintiles are examined. As shown by figure 5, this expectation is confirmed by the data: 
Although quintiles 4 and 5 are growing again in most countries between 1998 and 2015, the 
development in lower wage quintiles looks quite different than in educational quintiles. 
Instead of only two, seven countries now display a growth in quintile 1, meaning that the 
lowest paid occupations in these countries increased their employment share. 
Simultaneously, middle quintiles declined in all these seven countries, thus displaying a clear 
pattern of labor market polarization.   
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Figure 5: Relative Change in Employment Share by Wage Quintiles, 1998-2015 
Upgrading: Polarized Upgrading: 
 





*only period 2011-2015 covered for Portugal 
















































































































Among the countries with the most pronounced polarized pattern are Ireland, the 
Netherlands, and the UK, each showing growth of quintile 1 by 4% of total employment or 
more. 
Again, we also observe some countries where all lower quintiles are declining, but decrease 
is significantly faster in the middle than at the bottom of the wage structure. Therefore, these 
five countries display a pattern of polarized upgrading. Finally, instead of eleven, only six 
countries display a clear pattern of occupational upgrading if occupations are ranked by 
wages. 
 
Although many countries obviously change their pattern depending on the measurement of 
skills, it is remarkable that most countries don’t change their pattern completely. With the 
exception of Iceland, no country shows clear polarization using one measurement and clear 
upgrading using the other one. Four countries however changed from a pattern of polarized 
upgrading to one of clear polarization. Equally, another four countries changed between 
patterns of clear upgrading and polarized upgrading. It therefore seems plausible that these 
two ways of measuring skills are somehow related. But still, this is far from being proof that 
they actually measure the same concept. 
Overall, these findings imply a significant shift towards polarization if occupations are ranked 
by wages rather than educational requirements. Compared with the patterns based on 
educational quintiles, we now find more countries displaying clear polarization and less 
countries showing clear upgrading, while the number of those in between remains almost the 
same. Thus, it is clear that there is a stronger tendency towards polarization in a country’s 
wage structure than in educational requirements of occupations. This is in line with the 
findings of Fernández-Macías (2012) and Oesch (2013), as described in chapter 2. 
 
However, I can make a considerably stronger statement than Fernández-Macías and Oesch 
if I estimate the average change of wage quintiles. The results are depicted in figure 6: I find 
a perfect example of polarized upgrading as the average pattern of occupational change if 
occupations are ranked by wages. There is not only a slightly stronger tendency towards 
polarization, but there is systematic divergence from the patterns which are measured by 
education. Quintiles 1, 2, and 3 are all declining, but quintile 3 is declining the most and 
quintile 1 the least. Middle class occupations are therefore disappearing faster than lower 
class occupations, opening up a gap in the wage structure. On the other side, quintiles 4 and 
5 are both expanding as expected, with the top wage-earning occupations growing the most. 
Again, this average pattern shows in every 4-year period between 1998 and 2015. 
Furthermore, the pattern becomes more pronounced over time, displaying more decline in 




Figure 6: Mean Relative Change in Employment Share 
by Wage Quintiles, 1998-2015 
 
 
Therefore, it seems that occupations in the middle of the wage structure are in fact most 
affected by technological replacement on average. Occupations with the lowest wages are 
certainly also affected in many cases, but apparently less than those with medium wages on 
average. This clearly supports the theory of RBTC which claims that most routine 














6. Why Two Different Trends? 
 
I have shown in the two previous chapters that there is a tendency towards occupational 
upgrading in Europe if occupations are ranked by educational requirements, but a tendency 
towards polarized upgrading if occupations are ranked by wages. This seems to be 
problematic, since education and wages should both act as proxies for the same underlying 
concept, which is skills. As we remember, both SBTC and RBTC use skills to describe which 
occupations are affected by technological change: SBTC assumes that occupations with the 
least skill requirements are most easily replaced by machines, and RBTC predicts most 
decline in routine occupations which are found in the middle of the skill spectrum. Thus, our 
findings seem to be inconclusive. While upgrading patterns based on education support the 
claims of SBTC, more polarized patterns based on wages provide evidence for RBTC. In this 
chapter, I want to examine the cause of these conflicting observations in more detail and 
discuss the theoretical implications of my findings. 
 
 
Composition of Change across Quintiles 
 
As we saw in chapters 4 and 5, the educational structure and the wage structure of 
occupations are not identical in European countries. Several occupations rank higher in one 
than in the other and vice versa. Clearly, these discrepancies must be responsible for the 
diverging patterns of occupational change that we find between the two skill-measurements. 
If, for example, one strongly declining occupation requires very low education but earns 
medium wages, this occupation could potentially explain the whole difference between 
patterns of occupational change in the two structures. Or, of course, the difference could also 
be caused by a growing occupation with medium education and low wages. 
 
In our case however, we have several candidates that could potentially cause this 
discrepancy: Service workers, machine operators, and clerical workers are all shifting their 
position between low and medium quintiles, depending on whether quintiles are created 
using education or wages. Service and clerical occupations rank higher in education than in 
wages, and machine operators rank higher in wages than in education. Therefore, all of 
these occupational groups could potentially cause a shift from upgrading in education 
towards polarization in wages. However, we already know from chapter 3 that service jobs 
are generally expanding, while clerical jobs and machine operators are declining in most 
countries. Thus, only service jobs and machine operators could explain the shift towards 
polarization in the wage structure. The decline of clerical occupations, on the other hand, 




That said, we also have to consider major occupational groups that are distributed across 
different quintiles as potential causes for the different effects that we observe. The reason is 
that, in these cases, the composition of quintiles might also differ on the ISCO 2-digit level, 
even though it looks the same on the 1-digit level. If, for example, craft workers are found 
with similar shares in both quintiles 2 and 3, there might be some 2-digit craft occupations in 
education quintile 2 and wage quintile 3, or vice versa. And if the craft occupations in wage 
quintile 3/education quintile 2 decline faster than those in wage quintile 2/education quintile 3, 
this could partly explain the shift towards polarization in the wage spectrum. 
 
Figure 7: Composition of Occupational Change across Quintiles, 1998-2015 
 
 
In figure 7, the average pattern of occupational change across all countries in our sample is 
broken down into major occupational groups. For reasons of clarity however, only relevant 
groups are highlighted with colors. As can be seen, three major occupational groups are 
mainly causing the observed discrepancy in patterns of occupational change. First, machine 
operators only display significant decline in quintile 1 in the educational structure, but in 
quintile 3 in the wage structure. Second, craft workers are responsible for decline across all 
quintiles 1-4, but to different extent: Regarding wage quintiles, decline of craft workers is 
clearly strongest in the middle. But regarding education, decline of craft occupations is 
mostly limited to lower quintiles. Together, machine operators and craft workers already 
account for more than half of the decline in low education and medium wage quintiles. Third, 
service jobs are generally expanding in the middle of the educational, but at the bottom of the 










Plant and machine operators and assemblers
Craft and related trades workers
Service and Sales Workers
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and craft workers in the same quintiles, leading to relatively low decline in the middle of the 
educational distribution and at the bottom of the wage structure. Together, the impact of 
these three occupational groups on different positions in the wage and the educational 
structure can therefore explain why we observe a tendency towards upgrading in one and a 
tendency towards polarized upgrading in the other. 
 
This must mean that, at least for these three occupational groups, education and wages 
cannot be used interchangeably as proxies for skills. They clearly don’t measure the same 
concept and must therefore be treated separately by all researchers. Doing so not only 
brings us to a more accurate description of occupational change, but also dissolves the 
apparent contradiction between SBTC and RBTC: If we accept educational and wage 
structures as separate, independent descriptions of labor markets, then both theories can be 
right. SBTC correctly predicts general developments in the educational structure and RBTC 
does so regarding the wage structure. 
 
 
Technical Feasibility and Occupational Change 
 
Although we can dissolve the apparent contradiction between SBTC and RBTC by treating 
education and wages separately, doing so does not solve all theoretical problems. In fact, it 
brings up a new problem which is even more serious than the old one: If SBTC and RBTC 
are both correct, we don’t really know anymore what makes occupations grow or decline. So 
far, we only know that occupations with low education and medium wages are declining the 
most. But are they declining for the same reason? And if yes, is it skills, routine content, or 
something completely different? 
 
Clearly, the obvious answer to these questions would be to assume that occupations with 
low education or medium wages are on average most susceptible to automation because 
they are most easily automated. Nothing seems to contradict this intuition: It might well be 
true that the tasks of machine operators and craft workers are actually most easily emulated 
by machines and simply happen to rank higher in wages than in education. But without 
explaining what exactly makes these occupations most susceptible to automation, this is 
simply a reference to an empty theoretical concept. 
 
Therefore, we must test different propositions for characteristics that make occupations 
susceptible to automation. First, I follow the suggestion of SBTC and examine whether low 
skill requirements are the common cause that make occupations susceptible to automation. 
Of course, I should also consider both measurements of skills in this case, as I have 
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postulated in the last section. One measurement, however, is out of the question in this case. 
Skills measured by wages are clearly not the cause for decline, since occupations in the 
middle of the wage structure are declining the most. Therefore, skills can only possibly 
explain occupational change if they are measured by educational requirements. In this case, 
at least one match between theory and empirical evidence is self-evident: According to my 
analyses, occupations with low requirements are declining the most and highly educated 
occupations the least. This would support the view that occupations with low educational 
requirements are most easily automated. But accepting low educational requirements as the 
reason for decline would further imply that occupations with medium wages must on average 
display lower educational requirements than occupations with low or high wages in the 
beginning of our sample period. In any other case, susceptibility to automation cannot be 
measured appropriately by educational requirements. But as we find in figure 8, occupations 
in wage quintile 3 are usually not displaying the lowest educational requirements. Instead, 
there seems to be a linear relationship between education and wages: Occupations that 
require higher education, also earn higher wages on average. Therefore, educational 
requirements must be ruled out as a measurement of an occupation’s susceptibility to 
automation. 
Figure 8: Mean Educational Requirements 
across Wage Quintiles, 1998 
 
 
Another obvious candidate that I want to test is routine task intensity, as proposed by RBTC. 
Assuming that this measure can explain susceptibility to automation, we would expect it to be 
highest for occupations in wage quintile 3 and for those in educational quintile 1. The 
problem however is that routine task intensity is not as easily measured as average 
education or wages. Luckily however, several measures are at hand. I first test the same 
variable that was originally constructed by Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) and then used 
with slight variations in many subsequent studies supporting RBTC (Acemoglu and Autor 
2011; Autor and Dorn 2013; Autor et al. 2006; Goos et al. 2009, 2014). This variable is based 
on the US Department of Labor's Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) which provides 
detailed descriptions of the task content of more than 12’000 different occupations. To create 









researchers and then aggregated into a standardized scheme of occupations. In my case, I 
use a version of this variable provided by Autor and Dorn (2013) which includes values on 
routine task intensity for 330 different occupations. Even though these occupations are not 
originally coded according to the ISCO-scheme, I choose this variable for the sake of 
precision, completeness, and public availability5.6 
 
Figure 9: Mean Routine Task Intensity (Autor & Dorn) 
across Educational and Wages Quintiles, 1998 
 
 
In figure 9, the average routine task intensity of occupations is displayed for all educational 
and wage quintiles. Using the variable provided by Autor & Dorn (2013), we find that 
occupations with medium wages contain most routine tasks and should therefore be most 
susceptible to automation. Occupations in wage quintiles 1 and 5 are considerably less 
routine-intensive and therefore less susceptible to automation. Although not matching 
perfectly, we could use this distribution of routine task intensity as an explanation for 
polarization in the wage structure. 
 
The same pattern however can be observed across educational quintiles: Occupations 
requiring medium education consist of most routine tasks and occupations in educational 
quintile 1 show relatively low routine task intensity on average. This would imply that we also 
find polarization in the educational structure. But as we know, this does not correspond with 
our empirical evidence: Occupations with low education are in fact declining the most and 
thereby certainly declining less than occupations with medium education. Thus, routine task 
                                               
5 Goos et al. (2014) also use a version of this variable with ISCO88-coding, but only provide data for 
21 of 28 2-digit occupational groups. 
 
6 To apply this measure to European labor markets, I map the variable of Autor and Dorn (2013) into 
the ISCO-scheme. Thanks to the level of detail in the original data, I am able to obtain values for 
occupations on the ISCO88 4-digit level. These values are aggregated into 3-digit occupational 
categories, before they are matched with the original ELFS individual level data from 1998 until 2010. 
Next, I estimate mean values of 2-digit occupations separated by country and year, each weighted by 
their unique composition of 3-digit occupations. To obtain data for the sample period after 2010, I 
further map the 4-digit ISCO88 values into the 3-digit ISCO88 scheme. These values are then also 

















intensity as measured by Autor and Dorn (2013) is unable to explain patterns of occupational 
change in the educational structure all by itself. 
One might object to this conclusion by pointing out that it is merely based on average 
patterns. Possibly, the tested variable could accurately predict an upgrading of the 
educational structure in many cases, if the countries were examined separately. As I find 
however, this is not the case at all. The variable created by Autor and Dorn consistently 
predicts polarizing patterns for virtually all countries, both for wages and education (see 
appendix). 
 
Nevertheless, since the routine content of occupations is a topic of ongoing debate, I also 
test three alternative measures that were created more recently. One of them is a variable 
created by Fernández-Macías and Hurley (2017). It is based on data from the European 
Working Conditions Survey and measures the routine content of all ISCO88 occupations on 
the 2-digit level. Since the 2-digit level is not detailed enough to map values into the newer 
ISCO08 scheme, I can only use this variable for the period between 1998 and 2010. The 
second variable however is created by Marcolin et al. (2016) and is available at the ISCO08 
3-digit level. Thus, I am able to convert values into the ISCO88 2-digit scheme, thereby 
covering the whole sample period from 1998 until 2015. This variable also directly measures 
the routine content of occupations and is based on data from the OECD survey of adult skills. 
 
The third variable however requires a little more explanation, since it is technically not a 
measurement of routine task intensity. In fact, it is based on the insight that routine tasks are 
not the only tasks anymore that machines can emulate. As Frey and Osborne (2017) claim, 
machines have learnt to perform many non-routine tasks due to recent technological 
progress. One prominent example are autonomous vehicles: Originally, Levy and Murnane 
(2004) claimed that car drivers cannot be replaced by machines because it would be “hard to 
imagine discovering the set of rules that can replicate a driver’s behaviour”. But this is exactly 
what happened: Already in 2010, Google introduced their first fully autonomous vehicles 
(Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2012). Since then, technology for autonomous cars has been 
further developed by various companies, and now cars are even legally allowed to drive 
autonomously on public roads in certain places. And this is just one of many examples for 
technological progress in emulating non-routine tasks. Therefore, Frey and Osborne (2017) 
conclude that it would be more efficient to define the remaining bottlenecks of current 
technology than its countless existing capabilities. According to them, machines are still 
lacking the skills to compete with real people in tasks requiring perception and manipulation, 




Based on these insights, Frey and Osborne (2017) create a new measure of susceptibility to 
computerization. They analyze the task content of more than 700 occupations and determine 
the probability with which each occupation can be computerized7. I believe we can use this 
variable as an alternative measurement of routine task intensity, because it is also a task-
based measurement that wants to explain why certain occupations can be replaced by 
machines and others can’t. The only difference is that Frey and Osborne provide a more 
detailed (and probably more updated) description of the tasks that can actually be emulated 
by machines. Therefore, it should not be excluded from other variables that measure 
susceptibility to automation. 
Figure 10: Mean Routine Task Intensity 
across Educational Quintiles, Alternative Measures, 1998 
 
Figure 11: Mean Routine Task Intensity 
across Wage Quintiles, Alternative Measures, 1998 
 
Interestingly, all three alternative measures imply the same patterns of change across wage 
and educational quintiles. They all clearly show that occupations with the highest educational 
requirements and with the highest wages are least susceptible to automation. On the other 
hand, occupations with the lowest educational requirements and lowest wages are most 
susceptible to automation according to all three variables. 
 
                                               
7 Occupations are defined by Frey & Osborne according to the US OCC-SOC scheme and must 
therefore be mapped into the ISCO scheme. I apply the same procedure as with the variable provided 





































Frey & Osborne (2013)
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Regarding education, this matches our findings from before: The empirical data in fact shows 
that occupations with low education decline the most and those with high education expand 
the most. But in reference to the wage structure, our three alternative measures are less 
successful in predicting actual patterns of occupational change. As depicted in figure 11, they 
all claim that occupations with low wages are most susceptible to automation and should 
therefore decline the most. Occupations with medium wages are assumed to be considerably 
less susceptible and occupations with high wages to be the least susceptible. This however 
is clearly not the case in most European countries in our sample: Most often, wage quintile 3 
displays more decline than all others. Therefore, apparently none of these alternative 
variables are able to explain why occupations with medium wages are declining more than 
those with low wages. And again, this problem is not caused by cross-country variation: All 
three variables predict upgrading of national wage structures very consistently across 
countries (see appendix). 
 
Thus, we seem unable to find a generally valid explanation why certain occupations are 
declining faster than others. Each tested measure of susceptibility to automation can explain 
either upgrading in education or polarization in wages, but never both. This leaves us with 
only two possible options: First, we could assume that all our tested variables are inaccurate 
measures, and we just have to keep on searching for the real characteristics that make 
occupations susceptible to automation. Or, second, we could acknowledge that occupational 
change is not fully explicable by measuring how easily certain tasks can be automated. 
 
Although the first option can never be ruled out completely, it seems rather unlikely. Many of 
the newer measurements (as those displayed in figures 10 and 11) are certainly well founded 
in technological knowledge and seem to represent actual capabilities of recent technology. In 
many examples, they can coherently explain what makes an occupation easy or hard to 
emulate for computers. Accordingly, these measures all display significant correlations with 
observed occupational change in regression analyses (see table 6). Their plausibility is 
further supported by the fact that these newer measures all come to the same conclusion: 
Occupations with low wages and low educational requirements are most susceptible to 
automation. Thus, it seems very likely that our measures are in fact valid, but that there are 
other influences as well. This becomes even more clear if we realize what our variables 
actually represent: They measure nothing else but pure technical feasibility. And, as I am 
going to show in the following chapters, there are good reasons why we should not succumb 




7. A New Theoretical Framework 
 
Even though most researchers see technological progress as the main cause of occupational 
change, it is apparently impossible to fully explain patterns of occupational change without 
accounting for other influences as well. Therefore, I am going to present several alternative 
influences on occupational change in the following sections. Before I start however, it is 
important to mention that most of the presented effects are not part of the academic 
discourse on occupational change yet. The aim of this chapter is therefore merely to make a 
few suggestions for broadening the discourse. I neither claim that any of the proposed effects 
are in fact observable, nor that my list of potential effects is exhaustive. However, I strongly 
emphasize that technological determinism, as it is often practiced in the academic debate 
until now, is not a viable option in any case. Even if all our following propositions turn out to 




Costs and Benefits 
 
The first explanation, that I want to put forward, is based on the assumption that wage 
structures themselves are an important factor that we must consider when analyzing 
occupational change. It is necessary to start with this effect, because it clearly demonstrates 
the necessity to revise current theory and shows how it could be expanded meaningfully. My 
main argument is that SBTC and RBTC both ignore basic economic theory if they only 
consider potential costs, but not potential benefits of replacing a human worker with a 
machine. As we will see in following sections, many effects that are already discussed in the 
literature can only be fully understood if benefits are considered as well. Therefore, I want to 
provide a suitable theoretical framework first, before we can talk about these other effects 
properly. 
 
It is certainly indisputable that occupational change is fully dependent on decisions made by 
employers. Each employer, who has work to be done, can choose between hiring a person 
or buying a machine to take care of the work. As in each economic decision, the employer 
should carefully weigh up potential costs and benefits of each option, if he wants to make a 
reasonable decision. So far however, we have only discussed the costs of replacing a worker: 
the price of the machine. We simply assumed that occupations decline more if their tasks are 
easier to emulate for a machine, thus making the required machine cheaper (Autor et al. 
2003). Clearly, this is a very important factor and maybe even the crucial factor in most 
cases. If, for example, there is no machine on the market that is able to fulfil a complex task, 
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it is usually cheaper to hire a worker than to develop a new machine. Similarly, it is probably 
more efficient most of the time to buy a machine for tasks that are easily emulated. However, 
this view is obviously oversimplified, since potential benefits are completely ignored. And, as 
I argue, these benefits are sometimes highly important for employers’ decisions.  
 
Speaking in favor of machines, at least two relevant benefits must be considered. First, wage 
costs can be saved if a machine is bought instead of hiring a person. Naturally, the size of 
this benefit depends on the wage that a worker in the required position would earn. Saving 
high wages is a greater benefit than saving low wages8. The same idea obviously also 
applies to situations where employees are hired already. For example, we could picture an 
employer whose company has to become more efficient if it wants to compete on the market. 
Thus, the employer decides that he wants to cut costs by replacing one of the workers with a 
machine. All workers in his company earn different wages but are equally replaceable, i.e. 
machines to replace them all cost the same. In this case, the employer would probably fire 
the employee with the highest wage, since he can save most money by doing so. 
 
As this example demonstrates, the benefit of saving wages acts as an incentive for 
employers to rather replace high wage earners than low wage earners. Admittedly, situations 
in reality are seldom as clear as in the given example. Usually, machines that can replace 
high wage earners are more expensive than machines to replace low wage earners (see 
figure 11 above). For example, developing artificial intelligence to replace a manager is 
certainly more expensive than buying software for bookkeeping. Thus, the decision becomes 
more complicated: If an employer replaces a high wage earner, he pays more for the 
machine. But if he buys a cheaper machine, he saves less on wages. Higher benefits are 
therefore often accompanied by higher costs. 
 
Nevertheless, it’s not possible to predicts employers’ decisions by only looking at the cost 
side and ignoring the potential benefits of saving wages. Always, both sides must be 
considered: In some cases, benefits might be unusually high compared to the costs, and in 
other cases, the costs might be so high that benefits don’t matter at all. In fact, this could 
explain the observed patterns of labor market polarization regarding wages. As seen in figure 
11, susceptibility to automation is only decreasing slowly from wage quintile 1 to quintile 3, 
compared to the clear drop in susceptibility of quintiles 4 and 5. Thus, machines to replace 
any workers in quintiles 1-3 might cost almost the same. If this is true, then costs are not the 
                                               
8 Obviously, wages can also be interpreted as costs of hiring a human worker. However, additional 
costs of option 1 can always be translated into respective benefits of option 2. Since my focus lies on 
the option that includes automation, it seems appropriate to choose this perspective. 
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relevant factor here. Instead, potential benefits decide which occupations are replaced by 
machines and which ones are not. And, since it is more profitable to save medium wages 
than low wages, occupations in quintile 3 are more often replaced than those in quintile 1. In 
short: Tasks of occupations in wage quintile 3 are not much harder to emulate than tasks in 
quintile 1, but more money can be saved on wages here. 
 
One might ask now why occupations in wage quintiles 4 and 5 are not replaced more often, 
even though much more money could be saved on wages here. The answer is given by the 
steep drop in susceptibility to automation between quintiles 3 and 4. Apparently, tasks of high 
wage occupations are considerably harder to emulate than others, making machines much 
more expensive. In this case, the high costs of machines are not outweighed by the higher 
benefits anymore. Thus, costs seem to be the only dominating factor at the top of the wage 





Also building on the economic rationality of a cost-benefit analysis is my next proposition: I 
argue that the benefits of replacing a human worker are not only defined by saved wages, 
but also by potential gains in productivity.  
 
So far, we have assumed that machines and human workers are equally productive. One 
machine can replace exactly one human worker in these models. Thus, if the machine’s 
acquisition and operation costs are cheaper than the wage of the worker, the worker will be 
replaced by the machine. By doing this, the company can save wage costs and still receive 
the same amount of work as before. But if the wage of the worker is cheaper than the 
acquisition and operation costs of the machine, the worker can most likely keep his job. 
 
This simple model is certainly not wrong, and it is well capable of demonstrating the general 
importance of costs and benefits. However, it ignores that machines can be much more 
productive in certain tasks than people. In industrial food production, for example, one 
machine can replace nearly a whole factory full of people. Naturally, these machines are 
usually quite expensive. Therefore, the owner of the company must wisely weigh up the 
costs of the machine against the total wage costs of all workers. It is plausible however that 
in some cases, the machine will still be the more efficient option and therefore the company 
owner will replace all workers with only one machine. This clearly demonstrates the 
importance of productivity: A machine might be much more expensive than one worker’s 
wage, but the machine’s higher productivity enables it to replace more than one worker at the 
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same time. Therefore, the wages of all workers, that a machine can replace, must be added 
up before weighing them against the costs of the machine. In general, the relative costs of 
the machine decrease with increasing productivity, thus making the machine a more 
attractive option. If, for example, a machine can not only replace one worker at a time, but 
produce as fast as hundred workers combined, it becomes more likely that the machine will 
be used. 
 
It is important to note that productivity is not depending on how hard tasks are to emulate for 
machines. There might be several tasks that are very hard to teach to a machine, but once 
the machine has learned them, it can easily do them much faster than a person. The task of 
recognizing spoken language and giving appropriate reactions, for example, is certainly not 
easy to emulate, since there are countless combinations of words, which makes it hard to 
define universally valid rules for this task. In addition, the meaning of sentences often 
depends on context which is not explicitly mentioned, thereby making it even harder for 
machines to have a conversation with a person. Thus, reliable spoken language technology 
is currently still under development. Nevertheless, digital assistants like Apple’s Siri, 
Microsoft’s Cortana, Amazon’s Alexa or the Google Assistant are first examples of useful 
applications of this technology. And they are all making fast progress, as tests demonstrate 
(Munster and Thompson 2018). In 2018, Google even introduced a new feature to its 
assistant that allows it to make restaurant reservations over the phone autonomously. And if 
we assume that technology for speech recognition is developing further, we can easily 
imagine that it will start to replace human workers soon. Call center agents, for example, 
might become obsolete if all questions can be answered by machines. And in this case, the 
potential productivity gains are immense: One computer can easily replace hundreds of call 
center agents, since it can handle innumerable calls at the same time. Only limited 
computational power is required and there is no need for physical presence at any point 
during the task. Thus, one computer can sometimes easily replace a lot of people, even 
though it was very hard to find the rules describing the required task. Or, in other words: Low 
routine task intensity can occur together with high potential productivity gains. 
 
Naturally, the opposite case is equally plausible: High routine task intensity can occur 
together with low potential productivity gains. This could be true for supermarket cashiers, for 
example: Their work is rather monotonous and rules for their tasks are already well defined. 
In fact, machines already started to replace human cashiers in several countries. As we see, 
machines are easily capable of doing the tasks of cashiers. Nevertheless, one machine can 
only replace one worker in this case. Obviously, it is not possible for two customers to be 
served at the same time by one machine due to physical limitations. Multiple customers can 
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only be served at the same time, if multiple machines are deployed9. Thus, there are only low 
potential productivity gains in replacing a cashier, even though the required tasks are easily 
emulated. 
 
This argument could be of special importance with regards to machine operators, craft 
workers and office clerks which all show most decline on average. In all these occupations, 
machines can drastically increase efficiency: A computer can easily operate all machines in a 
factory simultaneously and without mistakes, a machine can produce tables a great many 
times faster than a craftsman, and a computer program can do the year’s work of a 
bookkeeper in a single instant. On the other hand, efficiency is not increasing by much if we 
let robots clean our streets, for example, since a cleaning robot can still only clean one spot 
at a time and takes time to move around. This might partly explain why elementary 




Preference for Interpersonal Contact 
 
In my next proposition, I want to part from economic rationality and argue that we must also 
take non-economic preferences into account when talking about occupational change. The 
argument is based on the assumption that people often value interpersonal contact as an 
end in itself, and not just as a pure means to pursue other interests (Levy and Murnane 
1996). This seems intuitively plausible and can probably be understood by most somehow 
sociable people. In addition, literature on life satisfaction supports this assumption by 
frequently referring to interpersonal contact as an important influence on people’s wellbeing 
(McGrath 2012). 
 
If interpersonal contact is indeed valued positively, this implies that people often prefer 
interactions with other people to interactions with machines. Of course, I must admit that 
people sometimes prefer machines if they provide a better or more efficient service. Buying a 
train ticket, for example, is much more efficient on a smartphone than at a ticket counter with 
a long queue. Therefore, many people prefer buying tickets on smartphones. But if a person 
and a machine provide the same service with equal efficiency, we would assume that many 
people would choose to interact with the person, simply because it is a person. 
 
                                               
9 Multiple customers can also be served at the same time if one machine offers multiple interfaces. But 
in the case of cashier machines, this is basically the same thing as having two machines. 
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This affects the cost-benefit analysis of employers in two ways: First, employers themselves 
might prefer working with real people to working with robots. Going to office everyday can be 
much more pleasurable, if there are some colleagues that you can talk to from time to time. 
Talking to robots is certainly an option, too, but it seems rather unsatisfying eventually. 
Second, employers must also consider the preferences of their customers: If they are rather 
served by a person than by a machine, the employer is wise to hire a person instead of 
buying a machine. But if he makes the wrong choice, many customers will probably avoid his 
company and switch to other companies where they are served by real people. Thus, the 
preference for interpersonal contact must be weighed among the benefits of hiring a person, 
or among the costs of buying a machine respectively. In consequence, some occupations 
that include interpersonal contact might not be replaced by machines as quickly as would be 
technically feasible. 
 
This is of special importance for service occupations, since they probably include most 
interpersonal contact: Although machines could provide many services in similar quality, 
most people probably feel more comfortable if they are served by real persons. Nursing 
robots, for example, could possibly take over many tasks of health care assistants (and 
already do so in Japan), but people apparently value personal contact as an end in itself and 
are rather taken care of by real people. Or another example: Barkeepers could quite easily 
be replaced by vending machines in theory. Mixing cocktails might be a little more complex 
than brewing coffee (which machines already do) but the concept is the same: Take certain 
ingredients and then follow a clearly defined recipe. But a barkeeper is not only there to 
serve drinks, but also to provide an opportunity for pleasant interpersonal contact. He can 
keep up some humorous small-talk while preparing drinks, for instance, and thus make the 
whole experience a more pleasant one. This could help explain why service occupations are 
expanding their employment share in most countries, even though machines would be 
capable of replacing at least some of them. 
 
 
Offshoring & International Trade 
 
Another alternative influence on occupational change, that I want to present here, is 
offshoring of jobs. Besides the effect of technological feasibility, this one is certainly the most 
frequently discussed in the academic and the public discourse. It was made prominent by 
Alan Blinder (2009) who introduced a measurement of offshorability that is used in many 
academic articles ever since. His message is simple: Certain occupations don’t require 
physical proximity to deliver their work. Therefore, these occupations can be offshored to 
countries with cheaper wages, thereby delivering the same work for less money. According 
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to Blinder, computer programmers, telemarketers, and computer system analysts are among 
the occupations that could be offshored most easily, since their work does not require 
physical proximity at all. On the other side of the scale, he lists occupations such as sales 
agents, photographers, and mail carriers, since they can’t do any work without immediate 
physical proximity. It would obviously be absurd to assume that someone can take photos of 
a wedding ceremony that is happening in another country or even just another city. 
 
Clearly, this affects the patterns of occupational change, since jobs that are offshored in 
large numbers tend to decline in domestic labor markets. Although many researchers 
mention this potential effect, only few actually consider it in their analysis of occupational 
change. To my knowledge, only Goos, Manning and Salomons (2014) estimate the effects of 
technology and offshoring in Europe in a combined model together with the effect of 
automation. However, they only found that the effect of offshoring was not shown significant 
in all combined models. Nevertheless, I also want to examine this effect by using my own 
sample. Therefore, I take the original variable of Blinder (2009) and once more map in into 
the ISCO scheme.10  
 
Figure 12: Mean Offshorability (Blinder 2009) 
across Educational and Wages Quintiles 
 
 
As can be seen in figure 12, average offshorability is lowest in quintile 1 of both the 
educational and the wage structure. Therefore, jobs with low wages and low educational 
requirements are relatively safe from being offshored. But offshorability increases with rising 
education and rising wages. In education, the peak is reached in quintile 4, before 
offshorability declines again in quintile 5. In wages however, offshorability increases up until 
quintile 5. Apparently, offshorability does not correspond to our observed patterns of 
occupational change: In the educational structure, offshorability would predict the contrary of 
what we observed. In the wage structure, a prediction based on offshorability would also be 
contradictory, since we don’t observe a decline of jobs in quintiles 4 and 5. 
                                               














The only thing that offshorability might actually explain is why jobs in the middle of the wage 
structure are declining faster than those at the bottom: They are clearly more offshorable. But 
since there is no correspondence between offshorability and our observations in all other 
areas, it is questionable whether offshorability really makes a difference. To answer this 
question, I estimate several linear regression models, using occupations’ change in national 
employment share as dependent variable11. By testing different measures of susceptibility to 
automation combined with offshorability, we should be able to isolate the effect of offshoring. 
Results are displayed in table 6. 
 
 


















0.121*** -0.049*** -0.006*** -0.082*** -0.375*** - 
Offshorability -0.024 0.038* -0.010 -0.016 0.005 -0.003 
Observations 2,873 2,873 1,950 2,873 2,873 2,873 
Adj. R2 0.038 0.006 0.040 0.011 0.023 0.0000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Apparently, my results confirm the findings of Goos, Manning and Salomons (2014): 
Offshoring does not correlate significantly with an occupation’s decline or growth, when 
controlled for the effect of automation. In fact, it doesn’t even correlate with occupational 
change in a stand-alone model. Only when combined with the variable created by Autor and 
Dorn, the effect of offshorability is slightly significant. Thus, assuming that Blinder’s variable 
is a valid measure of the concept, offshorability does not seem to be an important influence 
on occupational change in Europe. 
 
On the positive side, we note that all tested measures for susceptibility to automation display 
high levels of significance and point in the direction that we would expect. Nevertheless, 
explained overall variance is very low in all models, never reaching R2-values of more than 
0.04. This underlines the claim that technological feasibility cannot be the only determinant of 
occupational change in Europe. 
                                               
11 Occupations are measured at the ISCO 2-digit level. The change in national employment share in 
each 4-year period 1998-2002, 2002-2006, 2006-2010, and 2011-2015 is counted as an observation 
for each occupation. Robust standard errors are used to control for intra-group correlation since each 




Before moving on to the next chapter, I want to mention another effect that is closely related 
to offshoring: international trade. This approach claims that domestic production of certain 
goods decreases if these goods are imported in large numbers. Therefore, less workers are 
needed to produce these goods and employment in affected occupations declines. The 
similarity to offshoring is obvious: In both cases, jobs are moved from one country to another, 
where foreign workers produce the same goods that were produced by domestic workers 
before. The difference between the two approaches is mainly analytical: While Blinder 
focuses on specific tasks that make occupations offshorable, other researchers use 
exposure to import competition of economic sectors as their explanatory variable. Thus, they 
expect employment to decline in occupations that are affected by import competition. By 
using this approach, they usually find evidence for job decline, even when controlling for the 
effect of technological replacement. However, to my knowledge, existing studies only 
examine developments in the USA (Acemoglu et al. 2016; Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013; 
Autor et al. 2015). Therefore, this would certainly be an interesting approach to apply on 
European labor markets as well in future research. Within the scope of this thesis however, 




8. Country-Specific Determinants 
 
In the previous chapter, I have presented several factors that potentially shape patterns of 
occupational change in addition to pure technical feasibility. Together, these factors might be 
able to explain general trends in the occupational structure. However, the previous chapter is 
unable to explain differences between countries: The presented effects only describe why 
certain occupations are affected by automation (or offshoring) but ignore country-specific 
circumstances. This is clearly a shortcoming of my analyses so far, since there is 
considerable variation in patterns of occupational change across countries (see chapters 4 




Original Composition of Labor Markets 
 
If we want to explain national differences in patterns of occupational change, we certainly 
have to consider the various compositions of national labor markets in the beginning of our 
sample period. The reason is obvious: If labor markets are composed of different 
occupations, they probably develop differently. If, for example, certain occupations are 
virtually non-existent in a country, then there is not much potential for decline in these 
occupations. 
 
According to Oesch (2013:51), this is of special relevance regarding the decline of 
agricultural occupations. First, he observes that employment in agriculture is generally 
showing rapid decline due to automation. And since agricultural occupations are usually 
among the ones with least educational requirements and lowest wages, Oesch argues that 
potential for decline in bottom quintiles is depending on the national share of employment in 
agricultural occupations. Thus, if agricultural occupations account for a large share of 
employment, the potential for decline in bottom quintiles is higher than if bottom quintiles are 
almost entirely composed of other occupations that decline more slowly, if at all. 
Obviously, the decline of bottom quintiles is crucial for defining the pattern of occupational 
change: In fact, it makes the difference between upgrading and polarization. If bottom 
quintiles decline strongly, upgrading patterns become more likely, and if bottom quintiles 
decline slowly or even grow, polarized patterns are the consequence. 
 
As Oesch (2013:51) observes, there are large differences in agricultural employment 
between countries, thus implying significant differences in potential for decline in bottom 
quintiles. This is also true for our sample: In 1998, more than 17% of all employment fell on 
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agricultural occupations in countries such as Poland or Greece, while in many countries, 
agricultural occupations only accounted for little more than 1% (see Appendix). Thus, we 
would expect that countries with more agricultural employment are more likely to display 
upgrading patterns than others. 
 
To test this hypothesis, I analyze the original compositions of labor markets at the beginning 
of our sample period in 1998. To do so, I first divide all countries into groups according to 
their pattern of occupational change. Each country is categorized twice: Once for its pattern 
of change regarding the educational structure and once for its pattern regarding the wage 
structure. The categorization consist of three patterns, as can be seen in figures 3 and 5: 
upgrading, polarized upgrading, and polarization. I then compute the average composition of 
each quintile separately for these six groups of countries. 
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As can be seen in figures 13 and 14, the original employment share of agricultural 
occupations is considerably larger in labor markets that are displaying upgrading patterns in 
the following years. This applies to both the educational and the wage structure. In countries 
with little agricultural employment however, the share of service and elementary occupations 
in quintile 1 becomes significantly larger. And since service jobs are growing and elementary 
jobs are remaining constant on average, quintile 1 is less likely to decline in these countries. 
Thus, little initial employment in agriculture is associated with polarized patterns of 
occupational change.  
Of course, this correlation might only be a coincidence, and other occupational groups might 
in fact cause the change within quintiles that leads to diverging patterns of occupational 
change. To account for this problem, I also calculate the average composition of change 
across quintiles. In chapter 6, I have already done this for average change in the educational 
and the wage structure. Now, I want to break down these general trends into more precise 
descriptions of change within the six groups described above. 
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As we see in figures 15 and 16, agricultural occupations are largely responsible for the 
decline in quintile 1 in the educational and in the wage structure. Elementary and service 
occupations however have very little influence on change in bottom quintiles of upgrading 
labor markets. But this is changing if we look at polarizing patterns: Here, the decline of 
agricultural occupations is lacking almost completely, and is replaced by the stability of 
elementary occupations and the growth of service occupations in quintile 1. Thus, quintile 1 
is showing less decline or, depending on growth of elementary and service occupations, 
even overall growth. The composition of quintiles therefore corresponds with the observed 
change within quintiles: If a large employment share falls on agricultural occupations, bottom 
quintiles are declining faster, thus making an upgrading pattern more likely. 
 
 
Institutional Wage Setting 
 
National institutions are often assumed to set a certain wage floor, thus controlling how low 
wages can fall within a country. This clearly affects patterns of occupational change, if we 
consider not only costs, but also benefits: If wages in certain occupations are very low, then 
potential benefits of replacing these workers are equally low. In these cases, human labor 
might be so cheap that it’s not worth replacing them with machines. Thus, institutions are 
altering the benefits of replacing a human worker with a machine by manipulating the wage 
structure. 
 
Therefore, it is often assumed that countries with relatively low wage floors display less 
decline in low wage occupations than others. If labor is very cheap, there is little reason not 
to hire it, even though a machine could easily replace it. On the other hand, higher wage 
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human labor. In this case, low wage occupations should decline faster. In consequence, 
countries with low wage floors are assumed to be more prone to wage polarization than 
countries with higher wage floors (Oesch 2013).  
 
To examine the effect of wage setting however, we first need to understand how institutions 
can influence the wage structure. Only this way can we link single institutions with 
occupational change. According to the literature, institutions mostly affect occupations at the 
bottom of the wage structure (Fernández-Macías 2012; Oesch 2013). To protect laborers, 
most countries define a series of minimal standards in different domains, thereby defining 
characteristics of jobs with low standards more strongly than jobs with standards that are 
high already. The most obvious example is certainly minimum wages: By setting a minimum 
wage, a country defines a precise wage floor and thereby decides how much people at the 
bottom of the wage structure should earn. Someone who earned less than minimum wage 
before will necessarily earn more after the introduction of the minimum wage. However, 
everyone who earned more than minimum wage before already, is most likely not affected by 
its introduction. Possibly, some incomes close to the minimum would rise as well in order to 
maintain the occupational stratification, but higher incomes don’t need to adjust. 
 
By setting a relatively high minimum wage, a country therefore causes higher incentives to 
replace human labor in low wage jobs than there would be with a low minimum wage or none 
at all (Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante 2004; Oesch 2013). But legal minimum wages are not 
the only influence on a country’s wage floor. Other, less obvious effects also play their part: 
For example, collective bargaining through labor unions might set wage floors that differ from 
legal minimum wages in certain occupations. In fact, several countries in Europe don’t even 
have any legal minimum wage and regulate all wages through collective bargaining (e.g. 
Switzerland, Sweden, Norway). Thus, we might expect to find higher wage floors in countries 
where unions are more powerful (Hornstein et al. 2004). This is usually measured by rates of 
collective bargaining coverage within a country (Oesch 2013). 
 
Another potential effect is also regularly discussed in the literature, although its influence on 
setting wage floors is only of indirect nature: Unemployment benefits are thought to set an 
informal wage floor, since they offer a certain wage substitution without having to work for it. 
If, for example, the benefits amount 50% of the previous wage, it always pays off to accept a 
job with a higher wage than these 50%. But if the benefits are more generous and amount 
80%, it is unlikely that someone will accept a job with only 60% of the previous wage. Thus, 
people are less willing to accept low wages if unemployment benefits are more generous. In 
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contrast, the number of persons employed in low wage occupations is expected to rise more 
if unemployment benefits are low (Fernández-Macías 2012; Hornstein et al. 2004).  
 
Considering the low number of studies that examine occupational change in multiple 
European countries, it is no surprise that the number of those testing the influence of 
institutions is even lower. In fact, no results about the link between single institutions and 
occupational change have been published yet to my knowledge. Nevertheless, some authors 
treat the topic with different degrees of approximations. Rather vague, for example, is the 
conclusion of Hornstein et al. (2004) who find that there is a stronger tendency towards 
upgrading in Europe than in the USA, probably due to institutional differences. A little more 
detailed however are the observations of Fernandez-Macias (2012) who compares the 
patterns of occupational change across different institutional clusters within Europe. First, he 
finds that the top wage quintiles grow consistently across countries, but the development of 
bottom quintiles differs considerably. This supports the theoretical claim that institutional 
differences mainly affect low wage occupations. Further, he associates a tendency towards 
polarization with Continental Europa, and a tendency towards upgrading with Scandinavia. 
To some extent, this is also confirmed by my data (see figure 5). He explains this 
discrepancy with the different institutional settings of these clusters: In Scandinavia, wage 
floors are generally high due to strong unions and generous benefits, but in Continental 
Europe, the opposite is true. Finally, the findings of Oesch and Menes (2011) or Oesch (2013) 
are most detailed, but only include four or five countries each. They analyze the effect of 
institutions by examining wage floors, measured as the ratio between median wages in 
quintile 1 and overall median wages. Thus, rather than the source of the effect, they measure 
wage inequality as its intermediary. This seems sensible, since institutions only affect growth 
of low wage jobs by manipulating wage floors, according to theory. In both studies, the 
authors observe that high income inequality is connected with less decline in low wage 
quintiles. However, not all occupations are affected equally. It seems that, apparently, 
decline of service occupations is by far most dependent on wage floors: If wages in quintile 1 
are relatively high, they decline just like other occupations. But if wages in quintile 1 are 
relatively low, service jobs even grow in some countries, thus leading to polarization. This 
corresponds to our finding that service occupations are in general the only group in low wage 
quintiles which display significant growth (see figure 7). Oesch (2013) explains this finding by 
referring to the elasticity of service labor demand: If hiring a cleaning worker is rather 
expensive measured by one’s own salary, people simply clean themselves. But if wages of 





To test the effects of institutional wage setting independently, I analyze the change in 
employment share of relevant occupations under different institutional circumstances. As 
mentioned above, institutions are most likely to influence growth at the bottom of the wage 
structure. Therefore, occupations in wage quintile 1 are certainly a relevant group that I must 
consider in my analysis. Further, I include service occupations as a separate group, based 
on the findings of Oesch and Menes (2010) or Oesch (2013)12. All occupations are measured 
at the ISCO 2-digit level. The change in employment share in each 4-year period 1998-2002, 
2002-2006, 2006-2010, and 2011-2015 is counted as an observation for each occupation. 
Robust standard errors are used to control for intra-group correlation since each occupation 
is measured repeatedly within a country. 
 
To compare institutions across countries, I use several variables provided by the OECD. I 
measure minimum wages, union power, and unemployment benefits as relevant institutions, 
but also income inequality as the crucial intermediary. The height of minimum wages, for one, 
is measured by the OECD in relative ratios to average wages of full-time workers in each 
country. Union power is measured as collective bargaining coverage, and unemployment 
benefits as mean net replacement rates. Lastly, I use the OECD’s P50/P10 ratio to measure 
income inequality. It is perfectly suited for our purpose, since it measures the median of the 
lowest 10% in comparison to the overall median income in each country. However, this 
variable is only available starting with the year 2004 and even then, it is not completely 
available for all countries. Thus, I also use Gini-coefficients as a second measure of income 
inequality. Since OECD-data on Gini-coefficients is also incomplete, I use data from the 
World Income Inequality Database (WIID), thereby gaining almost fully complete data. 
 
To match data on institutions with data on employment shares, I estimate mean values of all 
institutional variables for the same 4-year periods as mentioned above. To account for 
reversed causality however, I lag the institutional variables by one year before estimating 
means. Thus, change in employment share of occupation X in country Y between 2002 and 
2006, for example, is matched with the means of our variables on institutions in country Y 
from 2002 until 2005. Unfortunately, data is still not perfectly complete for most 
measurements. Therefore, the number of available observations differs between variables. 




                                               
12 I have also tested for correlations with other quintiles and occupational groups, but none of them 
displayed any significant influence from institutions. 
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Table 7: Linear Regression Models Estimating Effects of Institutions 
on Occupations’ Change in Employment Share 
 Wage Quintile 1 Service and Sales Occupations 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
Minimum Wage 0.226 0.217* 0.184 -0.001 
Collective Bargaining 
Coverage 
-0.003 -0.002 0.000 -0.000 
Unemployment Benefits 0.011* 0.010** 0.004 0.002 
P50/P10 Ratio -0.266 - 0.473* - 
Gini-Coefficient - -0.006 - 0.029** 
n 316 532 153 239 
Adj. R2 0.013 0.012 0.007 0.013 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Using this data, I estimate the effect of institutions on change in employment share by 
employing several linear regression models. The results are displayed in table 7. Apparently, 
there seems to be no significant correlation between single institutions and change in 
employment share in any suspected way. Only unemployment benefits correlate significantly 
with wage quintile 1 in both models, but the direction of the correlation is contrary to what we 
would expect. While theory suggests that more generous unemployment benefits lead to less 
growth in low wage occupations, our data displays a contrary relationship. 
 
Nevertheless, our data confirms the finding of Oesch and Menes (2010) or Oesch (2013) 
who claim that service occupations grow stronger in countries with higher income inequality. 
In both tested models, variables measuring income inequality display a significant positive 
correlation with service job growth. Thus, it seems plausible that demand for service workers 
is dependent on their relative level of income. In other words: If service wages are low 
compared to other wages, demand for service workers rises. But if service workers earn a 
wage closer to the median, people more often renounce their services and do the work 
themselves or let a machine do it13. It is surprising however that this correlation does not 
seem to have an effect on growth in wage quintile 1. Apparently, the weight of service jobs 
within wage quintile 1 is not strong enough to explain general tendencies of the whole 
quintile. 
 
Thus, income inequality can (at least partly) explain why service jobs decline or expand, but 
not why wage quintile 1 declines or expands. We can explain this by considering the 
                                               
13  This is the standard explanation as proposed by Oesch and Menes (2010) or Oesch (2013). 
However, we must note that causality could also be contrarious in this case: Polarization could cause 
higher income inequality. By lagging variables, I try to diminish this problem. However, the direction of 
causality cannot be determined definitely. 
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distribution of service jobs across wage quintiles 1 and 2: If all service occupations within a 
country rank in wage quintile 1, inequality probably has a significant effect on the growth of 
the whole quintile. But if all service occupations rank in wage quintile 2, inequality does not 
affect wage quintile 1, since no other occupational groups are comparably related to 





So far, we have mostly been speaking about explanations for patterns of change in 
occupations with low wages or low educational requirements. This is certainly not wrong, 
since patterns are much more diverse in these quintiles than in occupations with high wages 
and high educational requirements. In virtually all countries under examination, the latter 
display unanimous growth. Nevertheless, rates of growth in these occupations differ 
significantly between countries. This must also be considered a relevant influence on the 
whole pattern of occupational change, since it affects the relative growth of other occupations 
as well. In fact, the rate of growth in top quintiles can determine whether other quintiles are 
displayed as declining or expanding in comparison. 
 
Figure 17: Hypothetical Patterns of Change in Employment Share, Depending on Quintile 5 
 
 
To illustrate this fact, two hypothetical patterns of occupational change are depicted in figure 
17. Absolute growth of occupations in quintiles 1-4 is exactly the same in the left pattern as in 
the right one. The only difference in absolute numbers is the growth of occupations in quintile 
5: On the right side, they grow much faster than on the left side. This however causes drastic 
















but on the right side, it is decreasing. Therefore, we observe a clear pattern of polarization on 
the left side and a pattern of polarized upgrading on the right side. The stronger growth of 
quintile 5 on the right side apparently outweighs all other growth and causes the whole 
pattern to change. 
 
With this effect in mind, I want to examine whether there is an explanation for the varying 
growth rates of top quintiles. In the literature, only one explanation is discussed, but it is a 
very appealing one. As claimed by authors such as Goldin and Katz (2007) or Oesch (2013), 
the limiting factor at the top of the occupational structure is labor supply. Since occupations 
with high educational requirements or high wages are not very susceptible to automation but 
benefit from it, suitable workers are generally in high demand. But if demand is higher than 
supply, not all open positions can be filled and thus growth of these occupations is limited. 
 
This effect can also be easily incorporated into our cost-benefit framework: If demand for 
suitable workers exceeds its supply, employers must compete against each other to hire the 
few available workers. Each employer must make the potential employee an offer that is 
more attractive than the other offers if he wants to have a chance of hiring the person. 
Obviously, making more attractive offers usually comes with higher costs, often in the form of 
higher wage offers. Therefore, workers in short supply often benefit from their scarcity, but 
employers are faced with additional wage costs. And according to our framework, these 
additional costs must be considered a reason for employers to buy machines instead of 
hiring workers. Thus, short supply of suitable workers leads to higher wage costs and finally 
to reduced employment in affected occupations. 
 
What “suitable worker” means, is obvious in at least one case: Occupations with high 
educational requirements need sufficient numbers of highly educated workers. And since 
occupations with the highest wages are usually also among the occupations with highest 
educational requirements, the same probably applies for them, too. Among the occupational 
groups, we expect professionals to be most dependent on highly educated labor supply. 
 
Highly educated workers can be obtained by countries in two ways: Either by training them in 
their own educational systems, or by immigration of workers that were trained abroad. 
Therefore, countries’ institutions are also important with regards to labor supply, since they 
shape educational systems and regulate migration. In my analysis however, I don’t measure 
the effects of these institutions separately, since they both have the same intermediary effect. 




The general hypothesis is quite straightforward: Higher supply of highly educated workers 
allows for more expansion of jobs in wage quintile 5, educational quintile 5 and professional 
occupations. Although “high education” is easily defined by tertiary degrees, it is not quite 
clear how to define the relevant supply of workers. Thus, I include four different variables in 
my analysis14: First, I measure the share of people holding a tertiary degree by taking all 
people in working age (25-64) as reference. This is certainly the most accurate way to 
measure how many people with high education are available within a country. However, 
occupational change might be more dependent on educational attainments of young people, 
since they are the ones who enter labor markets for the first time and therefore supply labor 
markets with new workforce for newly created jobs. Thus, I include the share of people 
holding a tertiary degree between 25 and 34 as my second variable. Variables number three 
and four are also based on these two measurements but try to consider the dynamic nature 
of occupational change. One could argue that the share of people holding a tertiary degree 
only determines the employment share of certain occupations, but not the change in 
employment share. What really influences this change, is how many additional workers with 
high education enter labor markets. Thus, educational attainments should probably rather be 
measured dynamically as well by considering the rate of educational expansion. To do so, I 
include two variables that measure change in the share of people holding a tertiary degree. 
One of them is in reference to the population aged 25-64, the other one to the population 
aged 25-34. 
 
To test these variables, I estimate their correlation with change in employment share of 
occupations that belong to the groups mentioned above. All occupations are measured at the 
ISCO 2-digit level. The change in employment share in each 4-year period 1998-2002, 2002-
2006, 2006-2010, and 2011-2015 is counted as an observation for each occupation. Similarly, 
I use mean values over these 4-year periods for variables containing population shares but 
lag them by one year. The variables describing change in population shares however are 
summed up over the 4-year periods, thus containing the total growth in the share of people 





                                               
14 All variables on educational attainments are provided by the OECD. 
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Table 8: Correlation Coefficients between Tertiary Education & 





Quintile 5 Professionals 
Tertiary Education (25-64) 0.0602 0.0159 0.0474 
Tertiary Education (25-34) 0.0861** 0.0456 0.0569 
Δ Tertiary Education (25-64) 0.2419*** 0.1929*** 0.2496*** 
Δ Tertiary Education (25-34) 0.1460*** 0.1628*** 0.1431*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Correlation coefficients are estimated pairwise, thus including all 
available cases for each pair of variables. 
 
As can be seen in table 8, absolute shares of tertiary education are not correlating 
significantly with occupational expansion in any of the tested groups. Educational expansion 
however shows considerably high levels of correlation in all tested groups. Thus, it seems 
like jobs at the top of the occupational structure grow faster if supply of highly educated 
workers is rising fast as well. Original levels of educational attainment in a population, on the 
other hand, are not important. Only change in educational levels is what affects occupational 
change. 
 
However, not all correlations of educational expansion are equally strong. Among the two 
variables, the one including the whole working age population (25-64) is clearly superior to 
the one only regarding the population aged 25-34. In all groups, the correlation between 
educational expansion and occupational growth is considerably higher when using this 
variable. Thus, we can conclude that educational expansion in the whole population must be 
considered, not only in the young population. 
 
Further, we can observe highest correlations between educational expansion and 
occupational growth in educational quintile 5 and in professional occupations. Wage quintile 
5 seems to be less affected by educational expansion. This is no surprise: It is obvious that 
occupations with high educational requirements are most directly depending on highly 
educated workers. And, since growth in educational quintile 5 is almost exclusively based on 
growth in professional occupations, it is unsurprising that both groups are equally depending 
on educational expansion. On the other hand, even though high wage occupations also have 
high educational requirements in general, some of them are not among the highest. Thus, 
high wage occupations are less limited by insufficient supply of highly educated workers than 




9. Occupational Change & Unemployment 
 
In all previous chapters, I have discussed why labor markets display a pattern of general 
upgrading in some cases, but more polarized patterns in other cases. At different points, I 
have also mentioned potential implications of these developments for individual labor market 
participants. For example, upgrading of labor markets is usually seen as a chance for upward 
mobility, since many jobs are newly created at the top of the occupational structure and only 
those at the bottom are disappearing. Thus, many labor market participants are facing the 
opportunity to climb up the social ladder and get themselves a better job than before. But in a 
situation of labor market polarization, this is not the case. Here, employees in rapidly 
declining middle-class jobs are threatened by social descent, since not all of them might be 
able to find a better job. Thus, it is likely that some former members of the middle class will 
fall down into occupations with lower wages. These effects are rather undisputed and could 
also be shown in studies using individual level panel data (e.g. Cortes 2016). 
 
However, some authors reject this view as an oversimplification, since only workers are 
considered who remain active parts of the labor market and are in fact able to find a new job. 
This excludes all people who don’t succeed in finding a new job and therefore become 
unemployed or leave the labor market altogether. According to these authors, this is of 
special importance for upgrading labor markets: In them, the strong decline of occupations 
with low educational requirements might cause unemployment, even though many new jobs 
are created simultaneously. Supposedly, not all workers, that were formerly employed in 
these lowly educated occupations, can find another job, since they don’t possess the 
necessary education. Many workers, who lost their job in this situation, will choose to be 
retrained in order to find a new job. But very likely, not all of them are able to do so. And for 
this group, risk of unemployment is very high, since not enough jobs with low educational 
requirements are available in a situation of occupational upgrading. Thus, jobs with low 
educational requirements might disappear faster than people with low education (Oesch 
2013:127). 
 
In a situation of polarizing labor markets, this seems less of a problem, since jobs with 
medium requirements are disappearing the most. Thus, some lucky people who lost their 
middle-class jobs can find a better one, and the rest can still settle for a job that requires less 
education than their former one. In polarizing labor markets, jobs with low requirements are 
not as hard to find as in a situation of upgrading, since they are not declining as fast (if at all). 
Therefore, labor market polarization is expected to cause less unemployment than upgrading 




This hypothesis is based on the work of Paul Krugman (1994) who claims that there is 
usually a trade-off between inequality and unemployment: If lowly educated workers are 
most at risk of becoming unemployed, a country can either choose to allow growth of low 
wage occupations, which leads to rising income inequality, or it can choose to pursue low 
inequality by keeping up a high wage floor, thus pushing some lowly educated workers out of 
the labor market and into unemployment. By replacing inequality with polarization, several 
authors used Krugman’s theory to formulate the hypothesis described above. This seems 
plausible, since labor market polarization is closely linked to rising inequality. However, 
empirical evidence in support of Krugman’s original trade-off is rather scarce (Glyn 2001; 
Nickell and Bell 1996). Therefore, it is not clear whether labor market polarization really 
allows for lower unemployment rates than upgrading labor markets. 
 
Unfortunately, empirical studies on this subject are not very numerous. To my knowledge, 
only two comparative studies have been conducted with a focus on the trade-off between 
polarization and unemployment. First, Hornstein et al. (2004) support the argument by 
providing positive evidence: They observe a strong increase in income inequality in the USA, 
while unemployment rates remain relatively constant. In Europe however, they generally find 
a considerable increase in unemployment, while income inequality remains rather constant. 
They explain this discrepancy by referring to institutional differences which allow for stronger 
growth of low wage occupations in the USA than in Europe. Thus, the USA seemed to 
accept higher inequality in exchange for lower unemployment, while Europe generally chose 
to accept higher unemployment. 
 
Oesch (2013), on the other hand, argues against the trade-off hypothesis by referring to 
evidence from Denmark, Spain, Switzerland, Britain, and Germany. Even though he finds 
that unemployment of lowly educated workers increases in times of rapid occupational 
upgrading, he claims that the causality is reversed: Unemployment among lowly educated 
workers leads to upgrading, not the other way around. In recessions, lowly educated workers 
are fired in large numbers for various reasons and therefore being pushed out of the labor 
market. This has not much to do with automation or any of the effects mentioned previously, 
but by pushing lowly educated workers out of employment, the occupational structure 
inevitably displays stronger signs of upgrading. 
 
Further, Oesch finds that overall unemployment rates did not increase significantly in any of 
the countries that he examined. On the contrary, he even shows evidence that upgrading is 
possible without increasing unemployment: In Denmark and Switzerland, strong growth 
among top quintiles and strong decline in bottom quintiles did not lead to increased 
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unemployment among lowly educated workers. Apparently, lowly educated workers 
disappeared just as fast as occupations with low educational requirements in these two 
cases. Thus, Oesch concludes that the trade-off between polarization and unemployment is 
not a necessity, if educational systems are prepared to train and retrain people according to 
the situational requirements.  
 
As these two contradictory conclusions demonstrate, there is no consensus about the 
relationship between polarization and unemployment. Therefore, I want to contribute to this 
debate by briefly testing the suggested effect with our data on occupational change. To do so, 
I use data on unemployment rates from the OECD, and calculate mean values for different 
groups of countries over time. The countries are divided into groups according to their 
pattern of occupational change, thus joining all polarizing, all upgrading, and all polarized 
upgrading countries together. Naturally, educational requirements and wages are treated 
separately in my analysis. The classification of countries can be reviewed in figures 3 and 5. 
 
Figure 18: Unemployment Rates across Patterns of Occupational Change 
 
 
As depicted in figure 18, countries that displayed a clear pattern of upgrading between 1998 
and 2015 were also the countries with highest unemployment rates on average. This applies 
equally to countries upgrading in the educational or in the wage structure. This can be seen 
as support for the trade-off argument. However, it is interesting that countries displaying 
polarized patterns are not the ones with lowest unemployment. Rather, polarized upgrading 

























the occupational structure and slow decline of bottom-end occupations provide enough 
opportunities for finding alternative occupations instead of becoming unemployed. 
Another interesting observation can be made by looking at the change of unemployment 
rates over time. Apparently, unemployment in upgrading countries is not expanding 
significantly more than in other countries. Rather, it remains at a relatively high level. 
Nevertheless, unemployment rates in upgrading countries clearly display the most extreme 
fluctuations. Thus, it seems like unemployment in upgrading countries is more depending on 
the economic cycle than in other countries. This could be interpreted as support for Oesch’s 
argument, as described above: In countries, that are severely hit by recessions, large 
numbers of lowly educated people are fired. Therefore, these countries are more likely to 
display patterns of upgrading. 
 




In addition to total unemployment rates, I also use a more specific approach by measuring 
only unemployment rates of lowly educated workers15 across these six different groups. The 
results are displayed in figure 19. As we can see on the left side, the relations are the same 
as before, but the gap between unemployment of upgrading countries and other countries 
has become even bigger than before. Also, unemployment is increasing considerably faster 
in upgrading countries than in others in this chart. Thus, the trade-off effect seems to be most 
visible in unemployment of lowly educated workers, if upgrading is measured by educational 
                                               























requirements: If more jobs with low educational requirements disappear, more lowly 
educated workers become unemployed. This is not a surprise, since it is exactly what theory 
would predict. 
However, even on the left side, countries with polarized upgrading are still displaying less 
unemployment than countries with increasing numbers of jobs in bottom quintiles. This has 
not been anticipated by the theory.  
On the right side, finally, the trade-off effect seems to have disappeared completely. No clear 
patterns can be observed, since all groups display similarly high unemployment rates and 
even switch ranks several times. Thus, upgrading of the wage structure seems to have no 
effect on unemployment of lowly educated workers. 
 
Together, these might be interesting findings which help to understand the effects of 
occupational change on unemployment. However, they are tentative at best. To properly 
examine the causal effects at work, one would certainly have to conduct more sophisticated 
analyses. For example, previous occupations of unemployed people could be examined to 
understand whether they were replaced by machines or whether they became unemployed 
due to other reasons. To my knowledge, studies of this kind are not published yet. Therefore, 









In the current academic discourse, it is widely accepted that technological progress is the 
main driver of occupational change. Nevertheless, there seems to be no consensus on which 
occupations are actually affected by automation in Europe. Some authors claim that low-
skilled occupations can be automated most easily and therefore they are bound to disappear 
first. Since high-skilled occupations are expanding at the same time, these authors predict an 
upgrading of the whole occupational structure. Other authors however argue that 
occupations in the middle of the skill spectrum are most affected by automation due to their 
higher routine task intensity. Therefore, these authors expect occupations in the middle of 
the skill spectrum to decline most quickly, while high-skilled occupations grow, and low-
skilled occupations remain relatively stable. In consequence, they expect that technological 
progress would ultimately lead to a polarization of labor markets. Obviously, these two 
theoretical approaches directly contradict each other. One clearly needs empirical analyses 
to determine which of those two scenarios is more plausible. However, results of existing 
studies are widely inconclusive: Some authors find evidence in favor of upgrading labor 
markets, others find pervasive patterns of polarization. To explain this discrepancy in the 
existing literature was the goal of this Master’s thesis. 
In my own analyses of 23 European countries from 1998 until 2015, I find several issues that 
can explain the observed discrepancy. A first reason can be found in the categorization of 
patterns. In addition to clear patterns of upgrading or polarization, many countries display a 
pattern of occupational change that lies somewhere in between. In these countries, 
occupations in the middle of the occupational structure are declining most quickly, but those 
at the bottom are declining, nevertheless. Thus, they show characteristics of both upgrading 
and polarization at the same time. Clearly, this leaves room for interpretation. Until now, 
authors usually categorized these countries as either upgrading or polarizing, depending on 
their preferences. This way, they could come to different conclusions even when in fact they 
were looking at the same patterns. For this reason, I argue that we must define a proper term 
for this pattern and treat it as a separate category. Since it displays characteristics of both 
upgrading and polarization simultaneously, I propose the term “polarized upgrading”. 
Second, I show that the measurement of skills is a crucial factor in determining the patterns 
of occupational change: If skills are measured by educational requirements, labor markets 
display a distinct upgrading pattern on average. But if skills are measured by wages, labor 
markets tend more strongly towards polarization, thus resulting in a pattern of polarized 
upgrading on average. The reason for this can be found in the ranking of occupations. 
Apparently, some large occupational groups are systematically ranked higher in the wage 
structure than in educational structure and vice versa. This clearly shows that education and 
wages cannot be used interchangeably as proxies for skills. These two measurements 
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obviously don’t measure the same concept and must therefore be treated separately in all 
cases. However, many authors until now have simply been using one of the two proxies 
without much consideration and claimed that they both measure skills. This can explain why 
different authors have found different patterns of change: They simply did not examine the 
same kind of occupational structure. 
Third, my analyses also display a wide variety of patterns across countries, even when 
examining the educational structure separately from the wage structure. Independently of the 
structure under scrutiny, some countries always show clear upgrading, some clear 
polarization, and some polarized upgrading. Even though countries tend more strongly 
towards upgrading in the educational structure, and more strongly towards polarized 
upgrading in the wage structure, there are always numerous countries which deviate from 
this average pattern. Some countries display polarized patterns of change in their 
educational structure, and some clear upgrading patterns in their wage structure.  This can 
only mean that, apparently, occupational change does not cause uniform patterns of change 
across different labor markets. It is therefore impossible to generalize findings from only a 
small number of countries, since patterns in other countries might look completely different. 
However, most studies on the topic examine only a small number of countries and thus seem 
to contradict each other at first sight, when in fact they only find different patterns due to 
different country samples. The observed cross-country variance is therefore at least partly 
responsible for the lack of consensus, simply because no uniform pattern can be found 
across countries. 
Together, these three issues can probably explain why there is no consensus on the patterns 
of occupational change in Europe to date. By considering these issues, it becomes possible 
to understand the existing empirical literature not as contradictory, but as complementary. 
Diverging results are therefore not necessarily caused by real disagreement over the 
empirical facts but are rather a consequence of the multifaceted nature of occupational 
change itself. 
 
However, these findings have important implications for the theories on occupational change. 
First, it is clearly necessary for any valid theory to explain why occupations in the middle of 
the wage structure and at the bottom of the occupational structure are declining the most on 
average. But as I show by testing different variables, both dominant theories are unable to 
explain the observed patterns of occupational change on their own. All available variables, 
that measure how easily occupations can be automated, predict patterns which don’t match 
our observed patterns. Thus, I conclude that technical feasibility cannot be the only relevant 
factor determining occupational change. In consequence, I conclude that the theoretical 
framework must be expanded in order to allow for other influences. I strongly suggest a 
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framework which considers potential costs and benefits of automating occupations equally. I 
also propose several possible factors that can be included in such a broader framework. 
These are wage costs, productivity gains, consumer preferences and offshoring of jobs. 
Second, the cross-country variance must also be considered by any valid theory. If certain 
occupations decline in one country, but grow in another, then clearly the inherent 
characteristics of these occupations cannot explain what is happening. Instead, we must look 
for potential causes in the country-specific circumstances. Again, I suggest several possible 
factors. For one, the original composition of labor markets is important: If nobody is working 
in agricultural occupations in a country, then nobody can be replaced by machines in these 
occupations. Further suggestions are based on the potential effects of income inequality, 
which allows for the creation of jobs with low wages, and of higher education, which is 
required for many growing occupations. 
Even though I find preliminary support for some of these effects with simple descriptive 
models in this thesis, all of them certainly require more elaborate empirical analyses. First, it 
would be necessary to find ways how to operationalize all the proposed effects, and then one 
should estimate multivariate models in order to separate the effects from each other. Until 
then, these suggestions should be treated as what they are: First indications of potential 
effects, but nothing more. The same also applies to another topic, which I briefly outlined in 
the last chapter: Even though I find higher unemployment rates in upgrading countries than 
in polarizing countries, this should only be seen as a preliminary result. More sophisticated 
research is clearly needed concerning this matter.  
Overall, this thesis can be seen as a refutation of technological determinism. It started with 
the assumption that technological progress determines the patterns of occupational change, 
since this is claimed by the dominant theories. In the course of this thesis however, it 
became clear that technical feasibility alone is unable to explain all the patterns of change 
that we observe in European countries. Therefore, I call for an expansion of the current 
theoretical framework and introduce several potential alternative effects. But still, we are far 
from having a complete explanation of occupational change based on empirical evidence. 
Some potential effects are not tested at all, and others only by using simple descriptive 
statistics. More complex models would be required to claim any real explanatory power. This 
clearly leaves room for future research. Nevertheless, it seems rather untenable now to 
assume that technology is the only determinant of occupational change. And whatever the 
other determinants might be, this means that we are not completely at the mercy of 
technology. Instead, it seems quite likely that we are able to shape occupational change 
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Change in Employment Share of Major Occupational Groups (ISCO) on 23 European Labor Markets, 1998-2015* 






















AT -1.59% +3.23% +7.23% -1.85% +0.81% -1.39% -4.22% -3.60% +1.40% 
BE +1.08% +6.16% -0.36% -4.66% +1.05% -0.61% -3.33% -0.49% +1.16% 
CH +1.91% +4.52% +2.56% -4.55% +0.63% -1.27% -2.17% -0.85% -0.79% 
CZ -0.55% +2.59% +5.26% -0.63% +0.34% -1.11% -4.01% +1.82% -3.72% 
DE -0.54% +1.89% +3.30% -0.29% +0.47% -0.39% -3.73% -0.70% +0.00% 
DK -2.45% +5.60% +5.96% -3.06% +1.95% -0.83% -3.26% -2.08% -1.82% 
EE +0.84% +8.37% -2.00% +2.19% +1.71% -3.75% -4.91% +0.30% -2.75% 
ES -0.86% +3.47% +3.93% -0.37% +4.81% -3.02% -5.11% -2.22% -0.63% 
FI -1.12% +4.87% +2.44% -3.78% +4.11% -2.37% -2.09% -2.33% +0.26% 
FR +0.86% +4.07% +1.49% -3.69% -0.77% -0.48% -1.96% -1.68% +2.16% 
GR -1.95% +4.33% +2.31% +1.43% +4.79% -5.53% -5.72% -1.35% +1.69% 
HU -0.41% +3.13% +0.53% -0.06% +1.60% -1.28% -5.93% +0.48% +1.94% 
IE -4.77% +4.62% +2.26% -0.80% +4.57% +3.77% -3.46% -3.87% -2.31% 
IS +1.17% +10.82% +2.81% -2.92% +1.83% -4.46% -5.59% -1.53% -2.13% 
LU -3.42% +17.44% +2.79% -5.01% -0.39% -1.91% -6.10% -3.38% -0.01% 
NL -2.56% +5.69% -0.67% -1.03% +1.95% -1.02% -2.95% -1.49% +2.07% 
NO -4.03% +7.73% +5.92% -4.14% +2.81% -2.89% -1.64% -1.39% -2.36% 
PL +0.80% +8.42% +1.47% -0.95% +1.34% -7.35% -3.92% +1.02% -0.83% 
PT -1.16% +7.36% +4.47% -0.57% +3.38% -3.78% -8.37% -0.22% -1.10% 
SE +0.58% +6.27% +2.91% -2.39% -0.43% -0.52% -3.65% -3.15% +0.38% 
SI +3.66% +9.37% +1.20% -3.10% +1.49% -6.88% -0.80% -7.90% +2.96% 
SK +0.42% +2.02% -0.02% -0.63% +4.70% -1.05% -5.92% +2.75% -2.28% 
UK +0.87% -0.10% +3.96% -3.86% +2.80% +0.21% -3.22% -2.32% +1.66% 
*Due to the altered ISCO classifications after 2010, the changes 1998-2010 and 2011-2015 are first calculated separately and then added together.  
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Predicted and Observed Patterns of Occupational Change (P=Polarization; PU=Polarized Upgrading; U=Upgrading) 
 Educational Structure 

























AT P U U U Other  P U U U PU 
BE P U U U P  P U U PU P 
CH P U U U PU  P U U U U 
CZ P U U U U  P U U U U 
DE P U U U PU  P U U U P 
DK P U U U PU  P U U U PU 
EE P U U U U  P U U U PU 
ES Other U U U U  P U U U Other 
FI P U U PU PU  P U PU U U 
FR P U U U P  P PU PU U P 
GR Other U U U U  - - - - - 
HU P U U U Other  Other U U U Other 
IE* Other U U U PU  Other U U U P* 
IS P U U U U  P PU U U P 
LU P U U U PU  P U U PU PU 
NL P U U U PU  Other U U U P 
NO P U U U U  Other U U U Other 
PL P U U U U  P U PU U U 
PT** P U U U U  P - PU U U 
SE P U U U U  P U U U PU 
SI P U U PU U  P U PU PU U 
SK P U U PU U  P U U U Other 
UK P U U U PU  P PU U U P 
* only period 1998-2010 covered for wage structure in Ireland 





Original Employment Share of Major Occupational Groups (ISCO) on 23 European Labor Markets, 1998 






















AT 8.1% 10.0% 14.1% 14.1% 13.1% 5.9% 16.9% 8.8% 8.9% 
BE 12.1% 19.0% 10.2% 15.8% 10.7% 2.3% 13.4% 8.0% 8.6% 
CH 6.2% 14.9% 20.0% 14.5% 13.6% 4.8% 15.0% 4.8% 6.1% 
CZ 6.9% 9.6% 18.1% 8.1% 12.5% 2.2% 21.3% 12.7% 8.6% 
DE 6.5% 13.3% 20.2% 12.8% 11.5% 2.1% 18.3% 7.5% 7.6% 
DK 7.2% 12.3% 18.2% 11.5% 16.2% 2.7% 11.9% 7.3% 12.7% 
EE 14.4% 11.0% 13.3% 4.4% 11.1% 4.9% 16.9% 12.6% 11.3% 
ES 9.0% 11.7% 9.0% 9.6% 13.7% 5.4% 17.1% 10.5% 14.1% 
FI 8.9% 17.2% 16.4% 9.1% 12.1% 6.5% 12.3% 9.8% 7.7% 
FR 9.3% 10.4% 17.2% 14.2% 12.3% 4.5% 13.4% 10.9% 7.8% 
GR 12.2% 12.1% 6.9% 9.4% 12.2% 17.3% 16.0% 8.0% 5.9% 
HU 7.1% 11.5% 13.1% 9.1% 13.3% 3.8% 22.3% 11.2% 8.6% 
IE 18.8% 15.0% 5.4% 13.2% 14.2% 0.9% 13.1% 9.8% 9.6% 
IS 8.5% 12.0% 13.4% 8.5% 19.0% 7.0% 16.2% 6.3% 9.2% 
LU 5.9% 14.7% 19.4% 15.3% 9.4% 3.5% 12.9% 8.2% 10.6% 
NL 12.5% 17.8% 18.0% 12.0% 12.9% 1.8% 10.9% 6.8% 7.3% 
NO 11.6% 9.0% 19.5% 9.9% 19.4% 4.4% 11.1% 8.4% 6.6% 
PL 6.5% 10.3% 11.5% 7.8% 10.0% 18.0% 19.1% 8.7% 8.2% 
PT 8.0% 6.2% 7.6% 9.0% 13.2% 11.8% 22.9% 8.6% 12.7% 
SE 5.3% 15.1% 20.2% 10.8% 17.7% 2.6% 12.0% 10.9% 5.2% 
SI 5.5% 9.7% 12.9% 11.7% 11.9% 11.4% 11.4% 20.7% 4.8% 
SK 5.8% 9.5% 16.6% 8.7% 11.9% 2.0% 21.1% 13.7% 10.6% 
UK 15.4% 15.5% 8.5% 16.3% 14.8% 1.1% 12.1% 8.2% 8.1% 
 
 

